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I. INTRODUCTION: SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH
ADMINISTRATION'S LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS
The history of coal mining legislation in the United States is said to be
"written with the blood" of coal miners. 1 Dating back to 1891, when the federal
government passed its first coal mining legislation, regulation of the mining
industry has consistently increased by implementation of new laws and policies
in an attempt to protect the health and safety of miners.2 The Federal Mine
Safety and Health Act of 1977 ("Mine Act") is the signature piece of mining
legislation, which sets forth the rights and obligations of both the federal
government and mining operators in attaining mandatory compliance with
health and safety standards.3 The Mine Safety and Health Administration
("MSHA") is the administrative agency responsible for enforcing the Mine
Act's regulatory procedures.4 MSHA's steady implementation of new policies
along with mine operator challenges has severely backlogged cases before the
Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission ("the Commission").5
The Commission is the independent federal adjudicative body responsible for
adjudicating operators' challenges to the Mine Act.6 The vast majority of the
case backlog is due to litigation of safety and health violations.7
MSHA's most recent and aggressive response to stem the tide of
litigation is its complete overhaul of rules stemming from the Pattern of
Violations provision ("POV provision") in the Mine Act. 8 The POV provision
gives MSHA the power to specifically address mine operators who repeatedly
I Brian Naylor, Mine Deaths Stir New Debate on Federal Oversight, NAT'L PUB. RADIO
(Apr. 27, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=126289636.
2 History of Mine Safety and Health Legislation, MSHA, http://www.msha.gov/mshainfo/
mshainf2.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2014).
3 See Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-164, 91
Stat. 1290 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-961 (2012)).
4 History of Mine Safety and Health Legislation, supra note 2.
5 Pattern of Violations, 78 Fed. Reg. 5056, 5059 (Jan. 23, 2013) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R.
pt. 104).
6 See 30 U.S.C. § 823 (2012).
7 See Pattern of Violations, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5059.
8 Id. at 5056-59.
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violate the same safety and health standards of the Mine Act. 9 If an operator
exhibits a pattern of violating standards that significantly and substantially
contributes to safety and health hazards ("S&S" violations), MSHA issues a
Pattern of Violation ("POV" or "pattern"), which notifies the mine operator that
it has violated the Mine Act. 10 A pattern terminates only when a subsequent
inspection of the mine reveals no additional S&S violations or if MSHA does
not issue a withdrawal order within 90 days after the POV notice. "
Until recently, MSHA enforced the POV provision with a notice and
hearing procedure that fostered communication between operators and MSHA
by providing an opportunity for operators to improve their health and safety
management prior to MSHA sanctioning it and halting its operations.'
However, on January 23, 2013, MSHA overhauled the POV enforcement
mechanism when it issued its "Pattern of Violations Final Rule" ("new Final
Rule"). 13 MSHA claimed the existing POV regulation did not fulfill the intent
of the Mine Act-to put perpetual bad actors out of business. 14 MSHA's new
enforcement procedure is extremely controversial, most notably because it
utilizes non-adjudicated citations and orders in its POV assessment. This
implicates operators' constitutional due process rights to notice and a hearing
prior to the halting of their operations. 15 The stakes could not be higher, as
public interest strongly favors safety. However, this interest should not be
upheld at the expense of operators' constitutional rights.
This Article discusses due process concerns in relation to MSHA's new
Final Rule. In Part II, the Article provides a brief overview of the disasters that
created the current legislation, as well as a synopsis of legislative history and
how cases proceed before the Commission. Part III provides an in-depth
discussion of the old POV procedures and the new Final Rule provisions. Part
IV addresses due process concerns surrounding MSHA's new Final Rule.
Finally, Part V provides an in-depth analysis of the due process implications
resulting from MSHA's new POV rule, stakeholder arguments concerning this
important safety regulation, and MSHA's options and path forward.
9 30 U.S.C. § 814(e) (2012).
10 Id. § 814(e)(1).
11 Id. § 814(e)(1)-(2).
12 Mark E. Heath & Joseph D. Garcia, Pattern of Violation: The Changing Dynamic of
Enforcement and Regulation Under the Mine Act, 32 ENERGY & MIN. L. INST. 587, 592-93
(2011), available at http://www.emlf.org/clientuploads/directory/whitepaper/HeathGarcia_
11 .pdf.
13 Pattern of Violations, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5056.
14 See id.
15 See Bruce Watzman, Senior Vice President, Nat'l Mining Ass'n, to Roslyn Fontaine,
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ii. THE HISTORY OF MINING LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
Congress enacted the first federal statute governing the coal mining
industry in 1891.16 Since then, federal regulation has consistently expanded to
improve mining conditions so as to protect miners from safety and health
hazards inherent in the industry. Often sparked by tragic accidents and
disasters, Congress enacts laws that heavily regulate the industry and greatly
affect the rights and obligations of operators to maintain a safe and healthy
workplace.
A. Disasters
The mining community in Upshur County, West Virginia, mourned the
loss of 12 coal miners in the Sago Mine explosion on January 2, 2006.17 The
Sago disaster was considered the worst explosion in the United States since
September 23, 2001, when 13 coal miners were killed in the Jim Walter
Resources #5 Mine in Brookwood, Alabama. 18 On May 9, 2007, MSHA
announced that the Sago explosion was likely ignited by lightning that struck
an abandoned area of the mine. 19
The Sago Mine disaster brought mine safety regulation to the forefront
of Congress's agenda.2° Only five months after Sago, on June 15, 2006,
President George W. Bush signed into law the "Mine Improvement and New
Emergency Response Act of 2006" (the "New Miner Act"). 21 This bill was the
legislature's first major reform to mine safety in over 30 years.22 President
Bush pledged that, "[w]e make this promise to American miners and their
families: We'll do everything possible to prevent mine accidents and make sure
16 History of Mine Safety and Health Legislation, supra note 2.
17 Sago Mine Explosion, January 2006, W. VA. COAL HIST., http://web.archive.org/web/
20120509070742/http://www.wvcoalhistory.com/id31.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2014).
18 Id. See generally UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AM., JIM WALTER RESOURCES # 5 COAL MINE
DISASTER SEPTEMBER 23,2001: A UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA REPORT (2003), available
at http://www.umwa.org/files/documents/UMWAJWRReport.pdf.
19 Press Release, MSHA, U.S. Mine Safety and Health Administration Pursues New
Regulations on Sealed Areas Based on Findings of Its Sago Mine Accident Investigation (May 9,
2007), available at http://www.msha.gov/media/press/2007/nr070509.asp.
20 Patrick R. Baker, The American Coal Miner, the Forgotten Natural Resource: Why
Legislative Reforms Are a Viable Solution To Solving the Case Backlog Before the Federal Mine
Safety and Health Review Commission Sparked by Tougher Enforcement of New Coal Mining
Health and Safety Laws and Regulations, 13 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 141, 142 (2011).
21 See Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response (MINER) Act of 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-236, 120 Stat. 493 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.).
22 See History of Mine Safety and Health Legislation, supra note 2.
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you're able to return safely to your loved ones. 23 The most significant reforms
to miner safety focused on oversight and enforcement and increased violations
and penalties for safety violations.24 However, the New Miner Act did little to
address accident prevention and failed to consider the harmful impact on
administrative efficiency that would result from an increase in litigation and
challenges to the new law.25
On April 5, 2010, 29 miners tragically died in an underground
explosion at the Upper Big Branch Mine26 ("UBB") in Montcoal, West
Virginia, the worst explosion in over 40 years.27 The mine had received 124
safety violations in 2010, dozens of which were citations for problems with
ventilation and accumulation of combustibles.28 Massey Energy Company
("Massey"), 29 operator of UBB, had allegedly "contested 97 percent of the
serious violations against it in 2007.,,30 After the explosion, Massey sent a letter
to the governors of Kentucky, West Virginia, Virginia, and Illinois, which
stopped short of blaming the ventilation plan approved and developed by
MSHA as the cause of the explosion.31 In this letter, Massey's CEO, Don
23 Naylor, supra note 1.
24 Baker, supra note 20, at 142-43.
25 Id. at 143 (citing MINER Act § 8).
26 Press Release, Alpha Natural Res., Alpha Natural Resources to Permanently Close Upper
Big Branch Mine (Apr. 4, 2012), available at http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ALNR/
3617505749x0x557769/a269aab4-Occb-47d9-9c58-6470d5756402/ANRNews_20124 4
Financial.pdf. Alpha will seal off the entrances with concrete barriers during the summer of 2012
after two years of idle activity since the April 5, 2010, explosion. Id.
27 Press Release, MSHA, US Labor Department's MSHA Cites Corporate Culture as Root
Cause of Upper Big Branch Mine Disaster (Dec. 6, 2011), available at http://www.msha.gov/
media/press/201l/nr 1 1206.asp.
28 Tom Hamburger & Andrew Zajac, Massey Energy's Safety Record Questioned After Mine
Explosion, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/apr/07/nation/la-na-coal-
mining7-2010apr07.
29 For an article discussing the 2011 sale of Massey to Alpha Natural Resources, see Tim
Huber, Alpha's Purchase of Troubled Massey Coal Company Gets OK, USA TODAY, June 1,
2011, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/energy/2011-06-01-massey-alpha-coal-
dealn.htm.
30 Naylor, supra note 1.
31 Dori Hjalmarson, Massey Goes on Offensive, Criticizes MSHA in Letter to Governors,
LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, June 9, 2010, http://www.kentucky.com/2010/06/09/1298150/
massey-goes-on-the-offensive-criticizes.html; Letter from Don L. Blankenship, Chairman &
CEO, Massey Energy, to Stephen L. Beshear, Governor of Ky., Joseph Manchin, Governor of W.
Va., Robert F. McDonnell, Governor of Va., Patrick J. Quinn, III, Governor of ll. (June 7, 2010)
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Blankenship, 32 stated, "[o]ur investigation into the UBB accident is continuing.
While we do not yet know the cause of the explosion, we have developed grave
and serious concerns about the MSHA imposed ventilation system employed at
UBB."3
On December 11, 2011, MSHA released its official report on its UBB
investigation.34 Contrary to Massey's concerns, the report listed several safety
violations in the mine as contributing factors to the explosion; however, it
concluded the "root cause" of the tragedy was the unlawful policies and
practices Massey exercised prior to the explosion. 35 The report concluded that
in the "longwall" area of the mine, a faulty water spray system created the
36ignition source. Additionally, Massey's failure to monitor and repair the
underground ventilation system in certain parts of the mine restricted airflow
and trapped dangerous amounts of methane in the explosion site.37 In fact, large
amounts of loose coal and coal dust accumulated and became the fuel for the
explosion.38 MSHA explained that the safety precautions Massey failed to take
were routine safety standards within the industry.
39
MSHA's report also revealed that Massey's poor managerial practices
contributed to the explosion. 40 First, Massey failed to perform required
examinations of certain areas, and when it did perform examinations, Massey
failed to remedy the hazards.41 Most notably, Massey did not examine the
levels of methane contained in the longwall area of the mine where the faulty
water sprayers ignited the explosion. Second, MSHA found that Massey
regularly failed to inform MSHA investigators of hazardous conditions in the
mine.43 Specifically, Massey would record the existing hazards in a
32 The embattled, and often controversial, CEO stepped down on December 3, 2010, due to
board and public pressure. Clifford Krauss, Under Fire Since Explosion, Mining C.E.O. Quits,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2010, B6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/04/business/
energy-environment/04massey.html.
33 Hjalmarson, supra note 31.
34 MSHA, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION: FATAL UNDERGROUND MINE ExPLOSION (Dec. 11,
2011) [hereinafter REPORT OF UBB INVESTIGATION], available at http://www.msha.gov/Fatals/
201/UBBI/FTLl0c033lnoappx.pdf; see also Performance Coal Company: Upper Big Branch
Mine-South, MSHA, http://www.msha.gov/PerformanceCoal/PerformanceCoal.asp (last updated
Jan. 13, 2014).
35 REPORT OF UBB INVESTIGATION, supra note 34, at 2.
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"production and maintenance book" for internal use only; however, those
hazards were omitted from the books MSHA examined. 4 MSHA discovered
that in 2009, Massey had twice as many violations as it reported. 45 Finally, the
investigation revealed that Massey regularly intimidated its employees by
threatening termination and other consequences if they reported hazards or
violations to MSHA.46 Massey also required certain employees to give advance
notice to underground miners when an MSHA inspector arrived on-site.
Employees testified they were repeatedly threatened and intimidated, and if
they did not conceal existing hazards when they were given this notice,
48consequences would ensue.
On June 1, 2011, Alpha Natural Resources ("Alpha"), the third largest
coal producer in the United States, purchased Massey Corporation for $7.1
billion.49 On April 4, 2012, Alpha announced its plan to permanently close
UBB. 50 However, the mine continues to act as a "lesson learned" example
within the industry, and both MSHA and the industry have been proactive in
preventing another UBB disaster.5' For example, MSHA continues to
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 5.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Press Release, Alpha Natural Resources, Alpha Natural Resources Acquires Massey
Energy Company, Creating a Global Leader in Matallurgical Coal Supply (June 1, 2011),
available at http://ir.alphanr.com/file.aspx?IID=4100842&FID = 11287162; see also Mario Parker
& Zachary R. Mider, Alpha Natural Agrees To Buy Massey Energy for $7.1 Billion in Cash,
Stock, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 29, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-29/alpha-natural-
agrees -to-buy-massey-energy- for-8-5-billion-in-cash-stock.html.
50 Press Release, Alpha Natural Resources, Alpha Natural Resources to Permanently Close
Upper Big Branch Mine (Apr. 4, 2012), available at http://files.sharcholder.com/downloads/
ALNR/3617505749x0x557769/a269aab4-Occb-47d9-9c58-6470d5756402/ANRNews_2012 4
4_Financial.pdf.
51 The Alpha Foundation, formed under a settlement between Alpha Natural Resources and
the U.S. Department of Justice, is committed to filling the gaps in current research on coal
miners' safety. Vicki Smith, Alpha Foundation Culls 160 Mine Research Pitches, DENVER POST,
June 21, 2013, http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci-23509279/alpha-foundation-culls-
160-mine-research-pitches. The Foundation was endowed with $48 million to spend on research
regarding the health and safety of coal miners. 1d. Part of this endowment included $9.5 million
in research grant awards, which the Foundation distributed to 16 recipients on September 30,
2013. Press Release, The Alpha Foundation, Alpha Foundation for the Improvement of Mine
Safety and Health Announces $9.5 Million in Research Grant Awards (Sept. 30, 2013), available
at http://www.alpha-foundation.org/uploads/AlphaFoundationPressRelease 20130930.pdf.
The winning research proposals include focus areas in safety and health management and
training within the industry. Id.
2014]
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implement corrective action plans in response to its Internal Review Report52
conducted after the explosion.5 3 The most recent corrective action was
completed on December 31, 2013.5' The persistence of MSHA, the Department
of Justice, labor unions, and the industry indicates a more proactive future for
improving the health and safety of miners. Notably, 2012 had the lowest
mining death and injury rates in the history of mining in the United States. 5
Despite the lessons learned, on August 6, 2013, an underground
explosion at Huff Creek Mine in Harlan County, Kentucky, resulted in one
fatality and two injuries. 56 The accident resulted from a coal pillar that burst
while the mining machinery continued to operate, trapping the miners.5 ' The
Harlan County mine had over 200 violations since January 2011.58 It is obvious
that despite the incremental improvement, MSHA and the industry's efforts can
only go so far if habitual offenders are allowed to stay in business.
B. Historical Legislation
The first mining statute, enacted in 1891, was incomprehensive,
applying only to U.S. territories, and implemented minimum ventilation
requirements at underground mines.5 9 After a decade of coal fatalities totaling
over 2,000, in 1910, Congress created the Bureau of Mines within the
Department of the Interior. 60 However, the Bureau's responsibilities were
limited and largely included conducting research and reducing accident rates.61
It was not until the Federal Coal Act of 1952 that the Bureau had significant
enforcement power, permitting investigators to issue imminent withdrawal
52 MSHA, INTERNAL REVIEW OF MSHA's ACTIONS AT THE UPPER BIG BRANCH MINE-SOUTH
(Mar. 6, 2012), available at http://www.msha.gov/PerformanceCoal/UBBIntemalReview/
UBBIntemalReviewReport.pdf.
53 Review of MSHA 's Actions at the Upper Big Branch Mine-South, MSHA,
http ://www.msha.gov/performancecoal/UBBIntemalReview/UBBCorrectiveActions.asp (last
visited Nov. 8, 2014).
54 Id.
55 Press Release, MSHA, MSHA Releases Final Data for 2012: Numbers Indicate Lowest
Death and Injury Rates (July 10, 2013), available at http://www.msha.gov/media/press/2013/
NR130710.asp.
56 Erica Peterson, Harlan County Coal Miner Dies in Underground Accident, LOUISVILLE
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62orders and citations for safety violations. However, a series of mining
disasters from 1967 through 1968, resulting in 533 deaths, prompted Congress
to take significant action to increase regulatory oversight.63
In 1969, Congress enacted the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety
Act ("the Coal Act"), which represented the most stringent and comprehensive
legislation to ever govern the mining industry. 64 Under this new legislation, the
Secretary of the Interior created the Mining and Safety Enforcement
Administration ("MESA") as the federal agency responsible for implementing
the expanded investigatory powers of the Coal Act.65 The Coal Act
significantly expanded federal enforcement powers by permitting random and
mandatory inspections and increasing inspections for hazardous operations.66
Notably, federal investigators were permitted to issue withdrawal orders that
closed hazardous areas of a mine until conditions were abated.67
However, the Coal Act was not significant enough, and in 1977,
Congress enacted the Mine Act. 68 The Mine Act replaced MESA with MSHA
69
and established the Commission as the adjudicative body for mine safety and
health challenges. 70 The Mine Act also created a split-enforcement regulatory
model that required the Secretary of Labor ("Secretary") to promulgate and
enforce, through MSHA, the health and safety standards articulated in the Mine
Act.71 The Commission would then determine industry challenges to
violations.72 Together, the enforcement scheme and Commission review
procedures were designed to prevent regulatory capture.73
For the next 30 years, the Mine Act did not change substantively
despite technological, engineering, and safety advancements. Notably, coal-
related fatalities nationwide dropped to 23 in 2005, an all-time low. Many
62 Id.
63 H.R. REP. No. 91-563, at 3 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2503, 2505.
64 History of Mine Safety and Health Legislation, supra note 2. For an original copy of the
Coal Act, see Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. 91-173, 83 Stat. 742,
available at http://www.msha.gov/solicitor/coalact/69act.htm.
65 History of Mine Safety and Health Legislation, supra note 2.
66 S. REP. No. 95-181, at 5-6 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3401, 3405-06.
67 Id. at 6.
68 Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-164, 91 Stat.
1290 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-961 (2012)).
69 See History of Mine Safety and Health Legislation, supra note 2.
70 See 30 U.S.C. § 823(a) (2012).
71 See Id. § 811 (a).
72 See Id. § 823(a).
73 See generally S. REP. No. 95-181, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3401.
74 See Coal Fatalities for 1900 Through 2013, MSHA, http://www.msha.gov/stats/
centurystats/coalstats.asp (last visited Oct. 5, 2014).
2014]
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within the industry and MSHA attributed the record to advancements in mine
safety technology and a renewed corporate culture centered on safety instead of
profits.75 However, in 2006, the Sago Mine Disaster and two similar explosions
76undermined this theory.
These tragedies sparked Congress to evaluate the effectiveness of
current regulations and safety laws.77 A former MSHA official emphasized the
"unfortunate" fact that "it took a disaster to bring renewed [legislative]
attention to the issue," stating, "[t]hat's the history of coal mining legislation in
the U.S.-it's always born[e] out of disaster and as it's said the safety laws are
always written with the blood of miners. That's what it takes. 78 In response to
the series of mining tragedies, Congress passed the New Miner Act on June 15,
2006, 79 which significantly increased civil and criminal penalties for Mine Act
violations. 80 However, the New Miner Act did not establish any procedures by
which MSHA could deter bad actors from persistently violating safety
regulations under the Mine Act.
C. The Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission: Attempts at
Reducing the Backlog
Once MSHA issues a citation or order for a safety or health violation, a
mine operator has a right under the Mine Act to contest it before the
Commission.81 In response to the mining industry's due process concerns with
MSHA's new Final Rule, MSHA insists the operator's right to appeal to the
75 See Mark E. Heath & Timothy D. Houston, Increased Enforcement and Higher Penalties
Under the Miner Act: Do They Improve Worker Safety?, 30 ENERGY & MIN. L. INST. 301, 302
(2009).
76 Seventeen days after Sago, on January 19, 2006, the Aracoma Alma Mine Number 1 in
Logan County, West Virginia exploded due to a misaligned conveyor belt that ignited
combustible materials accumulated in the mine. MSHA, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION: FATAL
UNDERGROUND COAL MINE FIRE 1-2 (2007), available at http://www.msha.gov/Fatals/2006/
Aracoma/FTL06c 1415total.pdf. The explosion resulted in the tragic deaths of two miners. Id. at
1. Four months later, on May 20, 2006, five miners at the Darby Mine Number 1 in Harlan
County, Kentucky lost their lives in a methane gas explosion. MINE SAFETY& HEALTH ADMIN.,
INTERNAL REVIEW OF MSHA's ACTIONS AT THE DARBY MINE No. 1, at 3 (June 28, 2007),
available at http://www.msha.gov/readroom/FOIA/2007IntemalReviews/Darby/20lnternal%20
Review%20Report.pdf.
77 See Heath & Houston, supra note 75, at 305.
78 Naylor, supra note 1.
79 See generally MINER Act, Pub. L. No. 109-236, 120 Stat. 493 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.).
80 Id. § 8; Criteria and Procedures for Proposed Assessment of Civil Penalties, 72 Fed. Reg.
13592, 13592 (Mar. 22, 2007) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 100).
81 See Notice of Contest of a Citation or Order Issued Under Section 104 of the Act, 29
C.F.R. § 2700.20 (2014).
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Commission is one factor that protects it against deprivation of a hearing.
8 2
However, a closer look at the Commission's case backlog, along with MSHA's
past and proposed attempts at decreasing it, reveal that appealing to the
Commission does not provide an adequate opportunity to be heard.
1. How Cases Proceed Before the Commission
When a case is appealed to the Commission, it is assigned a docket
number and referred to the Chief Administrative Law Judge ("Chief AL") for
review. 83 The Chief ALJ has the power to expedite the decisional process by
reviewing certain motions and issuing settlement, dismissal, and default
orders.8 4 Otherwise, the case is delegated to an individual Administrative Law
Judge ("AL"). 85 Once assigned, the ALJ is responsible for handling the case,
ruling on certain motions and settlement proposals, and adjudicating the final
hearing. 86 The ALJ's ruling becomes a final, non-precedential order of the
Commission.87 By the Commission's own initiative or at the request of a
litigant, a five-member Commission may provide administrative appellate
review of the ALJ's decision.88 However, a litigant does not have a fight to this
review; the decision rests in the affirmative votes of at least two
Commissioners. 89 The appellate decision is precedential, and a party may
appeal the decision to the U.S. Courts of Appeals. 90
Contests to citations and orders are directed to the Commission for
adjudicative proceedings. 91 Once an operator receives a safety and health
citation or order, 92 it has 30 days to file a notice of contest with the Secretary.
93
82 See Pattern of Violations, 78 Fed. Reg. 5056, 5061 (Jan. 23, 2013) (to be codified at 30
C.F.R. pt. 104).
83 FED. MINE SAFETY & HEALTH REVIEW COMM'N, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 3 (Dec. 16, 2013) [hereinafter 2013 FMSHRC PERFORMANCE






88 Guide to Commission Proceedings, FED. MINE SAFETY & HEALTH REVIEW COMM'N,
http://www.fmshrc.gov/guides/guide-commission-proceedings (last visited Oct. 4, 2014).
89 Id.
90 2013 FMSHRC PERFORMANCE REPORT, supra note 83, at 4.
91 See FED. MINE SAFETY & HEALTH REV. COMM'N, CASE BACKLOG REDUCTION PROJECT
JOINT OPERATING PLAN 2 (Sept. 7, 2010), available at http://www.fmshrc.gov/reports/joint
operatingplan.pdf.
92 See generally 30 U.S.C. § 814 (2012).
93 Review of a Subsequent Citation or Order, 29 C.F.R. § 2700.23 (2014).
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Additionally, the operator must comply with the following requirements when
filing the notice: (1) attach a copy of the order or citation; (2) state the reason(s)
for contesting the citation; (3) include all pertinent issues of law and fact; and
(4) state the relief sought.94 The o Perator must send a copy directly to the
Commission and to the Secretary, 9 who must answer the notice within 20
days.96 After the answer is filed and notice sent to the operator, the case is
referred to the Chief ALJ and docketed before an ALJ.
97
2. Implemented Procedural Improvements and Initiatives Aimed at
Ending the Case Backlog
The Commission has taken numerous steps with Congressional support
to reduce the case backlog. While some of their efforts show promise, overall,
the Commission and MSHA have failed to implement procedures that will
reduce the backlog permanently.
i. The Supplemental Appropriations Act
Congress's first legitimate step occurred on July 29, 2010, with the
passage of the Supplemental Appropriations Act ("SAA"). 98 At the time the
SAA was implemented, the Commission had a total of 17,591 trial-level cases;
the majority of which were an accumulation of backlogged cases from October
2007 through February 2010. 99 To address the stalemate, the SAA allocated
$3.8 million to the Commission. 100
The Commission implemented several different programs to effectuate
the goals of the SAA. 101 First, the Commission hired additional staff to manage
the caseload'0 2 and established six new ALJ positions. 10 3 The Commission
reported its allocation of resources resulted in significant strides. 10 4 However,
94 Notice of Contest of a Citation or Order Issued Under Section 104 of the Act, 29 C.F.R. §
2700.20 (2014).
95 Id. § 2700.20(c)-(d).
96 Id. § 2700.20(f).
97 See Guide to Commission Proceedings, supra note 88.
98 Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 111-212, 124 Stat. 2302 (2010); see also 2013
FMSHRC PERFORMANCE REPORT, supra note 83, at 5.
99 FED. MINE SAFETY & HEALTH REV. COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FINAL REPORT ON
THE TARGETED CASELOAD BACKLOG REDUCTION PROJECT 3 (2011), available at
http://www.fmshrc.gov/reports/4DOLFMSHRCreport.pdf
10 Id. at 2.
101 Id. at 3-4.
102 Id. at 3.
103 2013 FMSHRC PERFORMANCE REPORT, supra note 83, at 5.
104 FED. MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REv. COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 99, at 3.
[Vol. 117
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in January 2011, the trial-level number of cases increased to 19,135 due to an
influx of 11,412 new cases that had been filed over the SAA period.'0 5 By the
time funding had expired, the Commission had disposed of 11,643 cases.
10 6
Notably, two-thirds of those cases had been stalled in the backlog from 2007-
2010.1°7 While the number of disposed cases is commendable, the case
inventory at the end of the SAA period totaled 17,101, a difference of only 490
cases from its implementation. 1
08
Next, the Commission's Office of Administrative Law Judges
("OALJ"), implemented a prioritizing system for case disposal, where
unwarrantable failure citations and orders had highest priority, followed by
S&S citation cases. 109 At the outset of the SAA project, priority cases totaled
547 of the total backlog."t 0 By the end of the project, OALJ had disposed of all
but three of the priority cases."'
Additionally, the Commission instituted Global Settlement
Conferences ("Global Conferences"), which enabled the Commission to group
multiple violations assigned to one mine, to resolve disputes immediately via
teleconference. 112 Cases not settled were then referred to the Commission's
hearing docket.1 3 Throughout the SAA project, the Commission scheduled 17
Global Conferences comprising 99 cases and 854 citations. 114 By the end of the
SAA project, the Commission successfully settled 77 cases and 706 citations." 5
On March 23, 2011, the Commission took yet another stride in
reducing the backlog and proposed to Congress the possibility of implementing
an electronic filing system. In addition to filing, the program would facilitate
online access to files, manage all documents, and track cases electronically."
17
Consequently, in November 2011, the Commission "initiated pilot projects to
increase the use of technology in handling cases and to ameliorate potential
problems with e-filing." 118 In 2012, the Commission implemented the
105 Id.
106 Id. at 4.
107 See id. at 3.
108 Id. at 4.
109 Id. at 6.
110 Id.
I Id. The remaining three cases were not adjudicated due to the operators' failure to file a
timely answer.






118 2013 FMSHRC PERFORMANCE REPORT, supra note 83, at 5.
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electronic "case management system," which was scheduled for full
implementation in 2014.119 The system permits fully electronic filing,
management, and assignment and distribution of cases, in addition to automatic
notifications to parties and case tracking capabilities. 20 The Commission
describes this system as its most comprehensive effort for expedited case
disposal. 121
ii. Final Rules and Simplified Proceedings
Additionally, the Commission promulgated several rules aimed at
reducing the backlog and facilitating the adjudicative process.122  The
Commission published Final Rule 73955 on November 30, 2010. 123 Final Rule
73955 aimed to increase efficiency and time-management by requiring parties
who file a "Motion to Approve Settlement" to also submit a proposed decision
approving settlement. 124 Between December 30, 2010, and July 28, 2011, an
estimated 6,130 settlement motions were filed with the Commission pursuant to
Final Rule 73955.125
Also, on December 28, 2010, the Commission published a final
"Simplified Proceedings Rule," which attempted to streamline procedures for
processing certain civil penalty cases. 126 Under the simplified proceedings, the
Chief ALJ designates the cases eligible for simplified proceedings, most of
which include at least one of the following characteristics: (1) contains only
section 104(a) citations; 127 (2) proposed penalties are not specially assessed; (3)
does not involve complex issues of law or fact; (4) involves a limited number
of citations; (5) involves a limited penalty amount; (6) prospective hearing will
be only for a limited duration, defined by the Chief ALJ; (7) does not involve
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 See id. at 2.
122 See 2013 FMSHRC PERFORMANCE REPORT, supra note 83, at 2.
123 Penalty Settlement Procedure, 75 Fed. Reg. 73955-01 (Nov. 30, 2010) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. pt. 2700).
124 FED. MINE SAFETY & HEALTH REV. COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 99, at 5.
125 Id. at 7.
126 Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 81459-01 (Dec. 28, 2010) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2700).
127 Id.; see also 30 U.S.C. § 814 (2012). Section 104(a) citations are issued for violations of a
mandatory health or safety standard. The citation must set a reasonable time for abatement of the
violations. If a mine operator does not comply with an order promulgated within the citation, the
inspector issues a withdrawal order requiring all persons, with limited exceptions, to vacate the
area of the mine until the hazards have been abated. 30 U.S.C. § 814.
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solely legal issues; and (8) the case does not require expert witnesses.
128
Furthermore, if a party disagrees with the Chief ALJ's designation of
eligibility, either party can opt-out. 29 Likewise, if it becomes apparent the case
is no longer eligible for simplified proceedings, the case may be discontinued at
either the ALJ's discretion or the party's motion.
30
Once the Chief AU designates a case for simplified proceedings, the
Commission notifies the parties.' 3' Fifteen days after receiving notice, the
parties must file a "Notice of Appearance," although no answer is required.
32
The parties then have 45 days to submit all non-privileged documents that may
support the other party's claims or defenses.' 33 After the parties receive the
information, the AU is required to conduct a pre-hearing conference to discuss
settlement efforts, narrow the issues, make factual stipulations, and declare
witnesses, defenses, motions, and other pertinent matters. 134 However, prior to
this conference the parties must "explore" the possibility for settlement.
35
Once the pre-hearing conference is complete, the AU conducts a hearing to
resolve any issues not otherwise decided in the pre-hearing conference.
36
Within 60 days of concluding the hearing, the AU issues its final
disposition.
137
The Simplified Proceedings Rule became effective on March 1, 2011;
however, full implementation of the rule was delayed until May 2012.13 The
Commission insisted it would track the case disposal rate to measure the
program's success. 13 9 To effectuate this plan, the Commission established two
additional performance metrics to track the case-disposal time and the number
of cases processed through the program. 40 The 2014 performance targets were
established using the 2013 data.
14
128 29 C.F.R. § 2700.101 (2014).
129 See id. § 2700.104.
130 Id. § 2700.104(a).
131 See id. § 2700.103(b)-(c).
132 Id. § 2700.103(c)-(d).
133 Id. § 2700.105(a).
134 Id. § 2700.106(b).
135 Id. § 2700.106(a).
136 Id. § 2700.108(a).
13 Id. § 2700.108(f).
138 2013 FMSHRC PERFORMANCE REPORT, supra note 83, at 5.
9 Id. at 5-6.
140 Id. at 6.
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iii. Review Systems
In addition to new regulations, MSHA has implemented a review
system that inserts conferencing opportunities at the beginning of the formal
review procedure. 4 2 Due to the volume of cases before the Commission,
MSHA assigns its own employees to facilitate the conferences, serving as
Conference and Litigation Representatives ("CLRs"), instead of licensed
attorneys from the Department of Labor Solicitor's Office. 143 CLRs are
primarily experienced mine inspectors who directly represent the Secretary in
relatively simpe cases. I nn For example, CLRs do not usually handle S&S
citation cases. Operators attempt to negotiate settlements with CLRs to avoid
the cost and time of formal Commission procedures. 146 To do so effectively,
CLRs generally request a 90-day extension from the Commission to allow
more time to settle before filing a formal "Petition for Assessment of Civil
Penalty," which triggers Commission formalities. 1
47
However, a recent ruling by Administrative Law Judge Margaret Miller
indicates CLRs may not be properly trained or particularly competent to handle
certain cases.14 8 Judge Miller denied a joint request from MSHA and Alpha
Natural Resources to drastically modify citations against Brushy Eagle mine. 1
49
The ALJ's ruling revealed that a CLR had been assigned to a case that
contained S&S violations. 150 After the conferencing procedure with the
operators, the CLR's recommendations convinced Judge Miller that the CLR
was "not qualified, because she did [not] seem to understand mine safety
law."' 15' Former MSHA investigator and mine safety advocate Tony Oppegard
stated he was surprised MSHA would assign a CLR to this case, because
Brushy Eagle is a mine with a significant history of violations, some of which
the ALJ characterized as very serious. 152 Oppegard opined that because the
142 Reducing the Growing Backlog of Contested Mine Safety Cases: Hearing Before the
Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 1 I th Cong. 2 (2010) (statement of Michael T. Heenan) [hereinafter
Heenan].
143 Id.
'44 Alternative Case Resolution Initiative (ACR), MSHA, http://www.msha.gov/mshainfo/
factsheets/mshafct9.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2014).
145 Jessica Y. Lilly, Judge Denies Alpha, MSHA Request to Reduce Citation Seriousness, W.
VA. PUB. BROAD. (Apr. 25, 2013), http://archive.wvpubcast.org/newsarticle.aspx?id=29699.
146 Heenan, supra note 142, at 6.
147 Id.
148 Lilly, supra note 145.
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CLR did not understand the Mine Act, she also "[didn't] understand...
negligence... , [didn't] understand... [S&S], and if [she didn't] understand
those, [she didn't] understand the agency."
' 153
iv. Safety and Health Conferences
The changing structure of MSHA's Safety and Health Conference
("Pre-Assessment S&H Conference") is one of the primary causes fueling the
backlog. 114 Pursuant to 30 C.F.R. § 100.6, an operator has the right to request a
Pre-Assessment S&H Conference after MSHA notifies the operator of a safety
or health violation.1 55 The purpose of the Pre-Assessment S&H Conference is
to discuss the merits of any citation or order issued to an operator during an
inspection prior to formal litigation. 15 6 Importantly, despite the evolving nature
of the S&H Conference over the past several years, MSHA has maintained the
operator's right to request a conference as guaranteed by section 100.6 of the
Mine Act.
Pursuant to section 100.6, an operator's request for a Pre-Assessment
S&H Conference with an MSHA District Manager must be submitted in
writing within ten days of notification of a violation. 157 However, the District
Manager does not have a specified period of time in which to grant or deny the
request. 158 If the District Manager grants the operator's request, MSHA
considers additional information relevant to the issued citations and orders to
determine whether they should be vacated. 159 Notably, civil penalties are
assigned only after the conclusion of the Pre-Assessment S&H Conference. 160
On February 4, 2008, MSHA issued Procedure Instruction Letter No.
108-111-01 ("2008 PIL"), which permitted inspectors and CLRs to only
address "high negligence" or "unwarrantable failure" '161 citations and orders
during Pre-Assessment S&H Conferences. 162 The 2008 PIL represented a
153 Id.
154 See 30 C.F.R. § 100.6 (2014).
155 Id. § 100.6(a).
156 Seeid. § 100.6.
157 Id. § 100.6(b).
158 See id. § 100.6.
159 Id. § 100.6(c).
160 See id. § 100.6(d).
161 See 30 U.S.C. § 814(d)(1) (2006).
162 See MSHA Issues New Procedure Concerning Safety and Health Conferences, JACKSON
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drastic departure from MSHA's regular practice of granting conferencing
requests for any citations issued.
163
In March 2009, MSHA replaced the Pre-Assessment S&H Conference
with a Post-Assessment Enhanced Conference ("Enhanced Conference").'
64
This new procedure required operators to submit a written request to the
Commission for an Enhanced Conference only after MSHA had assigned civil
penalties for the citations issued during an inspection. 165 MSHA also restricted
the scope of the Enhanced Conference by warning operators to "carefully
consider the violations to be discussed in order to narrow the scope of the
conference and facilitate a more meaningful and efficient" review. 166 MSHA
claimed the Enhanced Conference would save operators and MSHA the time
and expense of litigation. 167
Although aimed at reducing operator abuse, the Enhanced Conference
propelled both parties into litigation and severely undermined
communication.168 Requests for Enhanced Conferences were often met with
"conference will be scheduled after ... penalties ... have been assessed...
[f]ailure to timely contest penalties will result in your conference request being
cancelled." 169 The lack of communication was a real impediment to mine
operators' opportunity for a fair review. 70 Without operator input, MSHA
relied solely on an inspector's report. 171 Due to the trust MSHA puts in its
inspectors, the likelihood of questioning the legitimacy of an inspector's
actions was unlikely.1 72 As a result of the procedural inadequacies, the
Enhanced Conference forced both parties to enter into costly and time-
consuming litigation; thus, formal contests were "the only reliable avenue for
dialogue."
' 173
In fact, on December 20, 2011, MSHA announced its plan to return to
the Pre-Assessment S&H Conference, where penalty amounts would once
163 Id.
164 See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, PROGRAM INFORMATION BULLETIN No. P09-05: PART 100
SAFETY AND HEALTH CONFERENCE PROCEDURE (2009), available at http://web.archive.org/web/
2013100310231 0/http://www.msha.gov/regs/complian/PIB/2009/pibO9-05.asp.
165 Id. (emphasis added).
166 Id.
167 Id.
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again be assigned after the conference took place. 174 MSHA decided to
reinstate the conferences based on the results of its Pre-Assessment Safety and
Health Conference Pilot Program (the "Pilot") conducted from August 31,
2010, through November 30, 2010.175 In the Pilot, MSHA reinstated Pre-
Assessment S&H Conferences in three of 17 MSHA districts.17 6 During the
pilot time period, operators could contact MSHA to request a Pre-Assessment
Conference to discuss violations and citations issued prior to a civil penalty
assessment. 7 7 The feedback from the participating districts was generally
positive; the majority of operators believed the conferences were a good idea
and should continue into the future. 178 They felt the conferences improved
communication with MSHA. 179 However, the Pilot also revealed that a
significant lack of resources could be a real impediment to effective
implementation. 180 For example, in one of the participating districts, 73% of
contested cases took greater than two months to schedule a conference due to a
lack of staffing. 181 Comparatively, the other two districts were generally able to
schedule conferences in less than 60 days. 182 In addition, MSHA contacted the
14 non-participating districts to specifically inquire as to what resources they
would need if MSHA reinstated the Pre-Assessment S&H Conferences.1
8 3
Overall, MSHA found the number of conferencing and clerical staff required to
conduct the interviews was directly dependent on the number of conferences
requested and granted. 184 MSHA stated that as the number of contested
violations continued to rise, additional staff in most districts would be
necessary to meet the conferencing demand. 185 MSHA concluded the resources
for conferencing in the districts should be seriously considered, in conjunction
with the resources available to reduce the backlog. 1
86
174 U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, PROCEDURE INSTRUCTION LETTER No. I11-V-I1: PART 100 SAFETY
AND HEALTH CONFERENCE PROCEDURES (2011) [hereinafter PROCEDURE INSTRUCTION LETTER
No. 11 -V-1 1], available at http://www.msha.gov/regs/complian/PILS/201 I/PIL 1-V-1 1asp.
175 See MSHA, EVALUATION OF MSHA's PRE-ASSESSMENT SAFETY AND HEALTH




178 Id. at 11.
179 id.
180 See id. at 12-13.
181 See id. at 20.
182 Id.
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Despite MSHA's projected and anticipated lack of significant
resources, MSHA planned to institute the Pre-Assessment S&H Conferences in
every district by March 2013.187 MSHA stated that "District Managers [were]
authorized and encouraged to implement the [P]re-[A]ssessment [C]onference
process immediately."'188 However, MSHA asserted that because of the
increasing backlog before the Commission, District Managers had the
discretion to grant conferences based on available resources, but not the
responsibility to do so.' 89 Moreover, MSHA admitted the District Manager's
wide discretion will make implementation occur slowly "or not at all in some
districts, until other backlog reduction strategies take hold and make caseloads
more manageable." 190
3. Results of the Commission's Efforts
MSHA's initiatives to reduce the backlog have shown promise. In
2012, the Commission received 9,060 new cases,'91 compared to approximately
10,600 in 201 1.192 The Commission normally anticipates a total of 11,000 case
dispositions annually.' 93 In 2012, the Commission exceeded that goal with a
total of 11,883 dispositions. 194 Notably, that included the Performance Coal
Company settlements (Massey's Upper Big Branch), which totaled 1,241
cases. 95 By the end of 2012, the Commission had 12,976 pending cases,
marking the second year the number of pending cases had dropped.196 In 2013,
the Commission received 6,898 new cases, which is a 24% decrease from
2012.197 The Commission also experienced a 72% increase in case dispositions,
totaling 12,262. 198 The Commission credits this increase to the special "backlog
187 See Press Release, MSHA, MSHA to Start Using Pre-Assessment Conferencing
Procedures, (Dec. 1, 2011), available at http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/msha/MSHA
20111703.htm.
188 PROCEDURE INSTRUCTION LETTER No. I1 1 -V- 11, supra note 174.
189 Id.
190 See Press Release, MSHA, supra note 187. As of February 21, 2014, MSHA had not
disclosed the number of districts in which the Pre-Assessment S&H Conferences have been
implemented.
191 See 2013 FMSHRC PERFORMANCE REPORT, supra note 83, at 10.
192 Id.
'9' See id. at 9.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id. In 2010, the Commission faced over 18,000 pending cases at the end of the year. In
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teams" within the OALJ that focused on resolving settlement cases.199 In
January 2014, the Commission faced 7,612 undecided cases, marking the third
consecutive year that the total number of pending cases has decreased.20 °
Despite these improvements, the pressure of quickly disposing of cases
to reduce the backlog continues to result in significant increases in the number
of appeals to the Commission .2 01 The Commission hears primarily two types of
appeals: substantive cases and default cases.20 2 A substantive case results from
"an appeal of an ALJ's decision on the merits," whereas default cases result
from "an operator's failure to timely contest a proposed penalty where it has
filed a motion to reopen the ALJ's final order., 20 3 Recently, the Commission
has faced a dramatic increase in both substantive and default contests.2 °4 For
example, in 2008, eight petitions for review were filed and only four were
granted, compared to 66 filed petitions and 43 accepted in 2011.205 The
Commission had a brief reprieve in 2012, with only 52 petitions filed and 27
granted.206 Most recently, in 2013, 54 petitions were filed and 38 were
granted.20 7 The general increase of petitions filed in turn places a greater
burden on the Office of General Counsel ("OGC"), which prepares draft
opinions for the Commissioners based on its research into the petitioned
substantive cases.20 8 However, compared to most administrative appellate
courts, the number of cases heard by the Commission is very small.209
Due to the backlog, in 2012 the Commission failed to meet its default
cases target.210 In response to two Commissioners' terms ending in 2012, the
Commission deemphasized ruling on default cases in order to spend additional
time on substantive cases. 21 This resulted in an increase of older default cases
pending for decision, and at the end of 2012, 41 default cases remained on the
docket.2 12 The Commission had set a target of only 15 cases.213 However, in
199 Id.
200 See id.
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2013, the Commission met its target goal for default cases and ended the year
214
with only nine pending cases.
Despite increased attention, the Commission also failed to meet its
2012 goals for reducing substantive cases.2 I5 Of the cases that had been
pending for 12-18 months, the Commission aimed to have only 6 cases
remaining by the end of 2012; however, it ended the year with 13, or 23% of
the total docket. 1 6 Conversely, in 2013, the Commission met its goal of nine
cases pending at the end of the year.217 The target for cases 18 months and
older was also not met in 2012, ending the year with 15 cases instead of two, as
the Commission had anticipated.218 In 2013, the Commission once again failed
to meet its goal of having only two cases pending by the end of the year;
instead, the Commission faced 31 cases at the beginning of 2014.219
The increased number of penalty cases at the trial level has also
increased the number of substantive cases on appeal.220 In 2009, operators
appealed only nine substantive cases to the Commission, compared to 55 in
2012.221 In 2012, the Commission anticipated that the increase in petitions
would continue to rise for the "foreseeable future and perhaps accelerate as the
Commission's judges issue a greater number of decisions in the course of
addressing the backlog., 222 In 2013, the Commission received 54 appeals and
met its prediction that the petitions would increase in the future.
223
The Commission's proposed and implemented backlog strategies have
shown that MSHA's policies consistently fail to address the underlying
problem-inconsistency and inefficiency within the administrative structure.
MSHA further complicated the problem by passing the new Final Rule for
Pattern of Violations, which altered the prior procedures at the expense of mine
operators' due process rights. A closer look at the evolution of the POV
procedures illuminates how the problem persists.
214 Id.
215 See id. In addition, the increased number of penalty cases at the trial-level has increased the
number of substantive cases. Id.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 13.
218 Id. at 14.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 12 (showing increased number of cases).
221 See id. at 13.
222 FED. MINE SAFETY & HEALTH REV. COMM'N, JUSTIFICATION OF APPROPRIATION ESTIMATES
FOR COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS: FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 12, available at
http://www.fmnshrc.gov/plans/FY12budget-request.pdf.
223 2013 FMSHRC PERFORMANCE REPORT, supra note 83, at 12.
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III. PATTERN OF VIOLATIONS
Congress created the initial Pattern of Violation enforcement scheme in
response to an investigation of the 1976 Scotia Mine Disaster in Letcher
County, Kentucky,224 where 26 coal miners tragically lost their lives in two
explosions.2 25 The investigation revealed that Scotia and other mines had
inspection histories of recurrent violations, which significantly contributed to
the disasters.226 Congress concluded the existing enforcement schemes in the
Coal Act were unable to address the problem of persistent bad actors.227
Congress intended the provision to be "[a]n effective tool to protect miners
when the operator demonstrates his disregard for the health and safety of
miners through an established pattern of violations. 228
Ironically, until recently the POV provision had rarely been used as an
enforcement tool.229 It was only on April 12, 2011, that MSHA issued its "first"
official POV notices to two operators, 30 years after promulgation of the
regulations. 230 However, from mid-2007 to today, MSHA has heavily exercised
its enforcement power under the pattern provision.231 MSHA's new Final Rule
became effective on March 25, 2013.23 The new Final Rule eliminates key
provisions from prior regulations that required hearing opportunities and formal
notice prior to issuance of a POV.233 Most importantly, the new Final Rule
relies on non-final orders to be included in the POV analysis.
234
The POV provision is economically devastating. After MSHA issues a
pattern, any subsequent safety or health violations require the inspector to issue
a withdrawal order, which restricts access to the affected area until the hazard
has been abated.235 This powerful tool halts operations and effectively closes
224 Heath & Garcia, supra note 12, at 589.
225 See Mine Accidents and Disasters: Scotia Mine Explosions, U.S. MINE RESCUE ASS'N,
http://www.usmra.com/saxsewell/scotia.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2014).
226 Heath & Garcia, supra note 12, at 589.
227 Id.
228 S. REP. No. 95-181, at 32 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3401, 3432.
229 Heath & Garcia, supra note 12, at 588.
230 Id. In 2008, MSHA issued a POV notice to National Coal in Knoxville, Tennessee;
however, it was quickly removed after a clean inspection. Id. at 588 n. 1.
231 Id. at 588.
232 Pattern of Violations, 78 Fed. Reg. 5056, 5056 (Jan. 23, 2013) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R.
pt. 104).
233 Heath & Garcia, supra note 12, at 591-92.
234 Pattern of Violations, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5056.
235 See Pattern of Violations (POV) Procedures Summary, MSHA, available at
http://www.msha.gov/POV/POVProcedures.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2014).
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the mine.2 36 MSHA has admitted that it is difficult for a mine to avoid further
violations during subsequent inspections after it already has been placed on
POV status.2 37 Only two mines have been placed on a pattern in the history of
the Mine Act and neither has reopened.
2 38
The prior pattern criteria sufficiently protected operators' rights by
providing multiple review and hearing opportunities prior to placing the mine
on a pattern. The prior regulations also permitted inspectors to only consider
final orders in its POV assessment. Now, however, an operator's opportunity to
contest notices and citations prior to being placed on a pattern are restricted,
and inspectors have the power to consider non-final citations and orders. The
implementation of MSHA's new Final Rule harms the economic vitality of the
mine and inhibits due process of law.
A. Prior Pattern Criteria
The prior POV regulations required two investigatory screenings prior
to issuing a POV, during which an MSHA investigator examined the mine for
S&S violations. 239 The screening process was divided into an initial screening
and, if necessary, a pattern of violations screening. 240 The regulations required
MSHA to review a mine's compliance history and conduct an inspection at
least once per year.241 Specifically, the inspector could consider S&S
violations, withdrawal orders, imminent danger orders, other enforcement
measures applied to the mine, evidence of a lack of good faith in correcting
S&S violations, accident or injury history indicating serious safety or health
management problems, and mitigating factors.242 Most controversial, and what
the new Final Rule omits, is that only orders and citations adjudicated and
236 See id.
237 Pattern of Violations, 55 Fed. Reg. 31128, 31129 (July 31, 1990) (to be codified at 30
C.F.R. pt. 104). MSHA stated in the POV Final Rule for the old Mine Act:
The Agency realizes that the statutory requirements for terminating a pattern
of violations sequence place a great burden on the operator of the mine. An
inspection of the entire mine, particularly a large underground mine, that
reveals no violations of a significant and substantial nature may be difficult
to achieve.
Id.
238 Press Release, MSHA, U.S. Labor Department's MSHA Places 2 Mining Operations on
Pattern of Violations Status: Unprecedented Enforcement Action Is First in Mine Act History
(Apr. 12, 2011), available at http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/msha/MSHA20110532.htm.
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confirmed by the Commission ("final orders") could be considered during the
screening 243
If the initial screening revealed a recurring pattern of S&S violations,
MSHA conducted a second screening to determine if the mine had a potential
POV ("PPOV"). 244 During the PPOV screening, MSHA evaluated the
operator's history of S&S violations and any S&S violations specifically
related to the identified hazard(s).245 It also determined whether the operator's
unwarrantable failure to comply caused the S&S violations.2 46 Notably, MSHA
also was limited to review of final orders during the PPOV screening.
Previously, if an inspector identified a PPOV the MSHA District
Manager provided written notice to the operator describing the specific basis
for its finding.248 Within 20 days, the operator could review the inspection
documents and provide additional information to explain discrepancies or
mistakes. 249 The operator could request a conference with a District Manager to
discuss the PPOV notice and propose solutions.250 Also, the operator could
choose to implement a safety plan to prevent future S&S violations.2 51 If the
operator elected, the District Manager could take up to 90 days to review the
program's effectiveness at reducing S&S violations.252 If the District Manager
continued to believe the mine was at risk of a pattern, she reported her
evaluation to the MSHA Administrator ("Administrator") within four months
of the mine's PPOV notice or within two months if the mine did not implement
a safety program.253 Ten days prior to submitting the report, MSHA provided
the operator with a copy of the report and the operator could submit written
comments to the Administrator.25 Within 30 days of receiving the district
manager's report, the Administrator issued his decision of whether or not the
mine should be placed on a pattern.255 MSHA could then terminate the pattern
notice if the inspector did not find any S&S violations in a subsequent
243 Id. at 600-01.
244 Id. at 592.
245 Id. at 597.
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inspection or if MSHA had not issued a withdrawal order within 90 days of the
256pattern notice.
As set forth in the Mine Act, once a mine is placed on POV status it is
subject to a closure order if any S&S violation is discovered during a
subsequent inspection.257 While on a pattern, an operator could request an
inspection to terminate the pattern designation; however, MSHA did not have
to provide notice and solely determined the parameters of the investigation.258
B. Current Pattern Criteria
MSHA created its new Final Rule in response to findings from the
Office of the Inspector General's report ("OIG report") on MSHA's faulty
implementation of its pattern authority. 259 The OIG audited MSHA in response
to heightened concern regarding MSHA's process for identifying mines with
POVs. 260 The report found the POV regulations limited MSHA's ability to
exercise its POV authority as the Mine Act intended and made it difficult to
place mines on POV status.261 As a result, MSHA created its new Final Rule to
comply with statutory and legislative intent to restore safe and healthy working
conditions to noncompliant mines.
2 62
The most controversial aspect of the law is the fact that the new Final
Rule severely restricts notice and hearing procedures.263 Specifically, it
eliminates the two-step PPOV notice and review process, and it permits MSHA
inspectors to consider non-final citations and orders in its POV assessment.2 6
The industry vehemently asserts these revisions eliminate an operator's due
265
process rights to notice and hearing prior to issuance of a pattern notice.
256 Id. at 594.
257 30 U.S.C. § 814(e)(1) (2013).
258 See id.
259 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, IN 32 YEARS MSHA HAS NEVER








265 Heath & Garcia, supra note 12, at 599.
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1. Elimination of PPOV Notice Procedures
MSHA strongly disputes the industry's due process concerns. 266 It
argues its current review procedures, as well as the Mine Act, confer adequate
procedural due process.267 MSHA's reasoning is largely based on its position
that operators have a continuing obligation to remain current with their
compliance history. 68 Specifically, MSHA argues that mine operators should
know the details of their compliance history; therefore, advance notice to an
operator who may be approaching a pattern is unnecessary.269 MSHA also
believes the new Final Rule will incentivize mine operators to continually
evaluate their performance on a long-term basis.
270
To fulfill the operator's responsibility, MSHA encourages use of its
computerized notification program, the "Online Monthly Monitoring Tool"
("Monitoring Tool"), as a replacement for the PPOV screening. 271 The
Monitoring Tool is available 24 hours a day, and it displays the amount and
type of an operator's violations compared to MSHA's pattern criteria posted on
its website.2 2 Additionally, the online program indicates whether the operator's
S&S violations trigger POV criteria.273 MSHA insists the Monitoring Tool
eliminates "uncertainty surrounding POV status" and allows operators to
perform "the same review of their compliance and accident data as MSHA. ' 74
MSHA also asserts the Monitoring Tool allows operators to verify the accuracy
of the information.275 MSHA concludes that, collectively, citations and orders
issued to a mine, the constant availability of POV criteria posted on its website,
and greater use of the Monitoring Tool provides sufficient notice to "alert
operators of the possibility they may be subject to a POV."
276
Furthermore, MSHA maintains that its regulatory procedures and
certain Mine Act provisions provide sufficient review opportunities to satisfy
due process. 277 In support, MSHA provides five pre- and post-deprivation
procedures that exist in its regulatory scheme: (1) operators may discuss
citations and orders with an inspector during the inspection and at the informal
266 Pattern of Violations, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5061.
267 id.
268 Id. at 5058.
269 Id.
270 Id. at 5059.
211 Id. at 5058.
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closeout conference; (2) operators may request a Pre-Assessment S&H
Conference to review citations and orders, and present additional evidence; (3)
an operator approaching POV status may implement a corrective action plan
("CAP") to reduce future S&S violations; (4) the operator can meet with a
District Manager to discuss discrepancies in MSHA's data when it is issued a
POV; and (5) an operator's right under the Mine Act to request expedited
temporary relief from a POV is an adequate post-deprivation procedure.278 In
its new Final Rule, MSHA argues these provisions are satisfactory in providing
notice and hearing to operators prior to issuing a pattern.27 9
First, MSHA asserts that mine operators can discuss citations and
orders with an inspector both during the inspection and at the informal closeout
conference.2 80 Following an inspection, the inspector must schedule an
informal closeout conference with the operator. 281 During the conference, the
inspector provides "a summary of all enforcement actions taken,, 282 which
includes issued citations and orders.283 Additionally, the operator must develop
a plan to prevent recurrence of "violations, hazards, and accidents. 284 The
inspector is responsible for informing the District Manager of any concerns
discussed in the meeting.285
Second, MSHA states that an operator can request a Pre-Assessment
S&H Conference with a District Manager or a field office supervisor to review
citations and orders, in addition to presenting other relevant evidence. 286 During
this conference, MSHA provides an interpretation of regulations and discusses
potential disputes in MSHA's data prior to issuing a civil penalty or287
commencing formal litigation. Under the Mine Act, a mine operator has the
right to contest each citation or order issued after an inspection.
However, MSHA has sole discretion to grant the request for a
conference and to determine its nature.289 Within ten days of receiving a




281 MSHA, COAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH GENERAL INSPECTION PROCEDURES HANDBOOK
2-6 to -7 (2013) [hereinafter GENERAL INSPECTION PROCEDURES HANDBOOK], available at
http://www.msha.gov/READROOM/HANDBOOK/PH 13-V-i .pdf.
282 Id. at 2-7.
283 Pattern of Violations, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5061.
284 GENERAL INSPECTION PROCEDURES HANDBOOK, supra note 281, at 2-7.
285 Id.
286 Pattern of Violations, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5061.
287 Id.
288 30 C.F.R. § 100.6(a) (2013).
289 Id. § 100.6(b).
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Assessment S&H Conference, which must be in writing and include a brief
statement of the reason(s) why each citation or order should be reviewed.29 °
During the conference, all parties may submit additional information relevant
291to the citation, including any mitigating circumstances implemented by the
operator.292 MSHA reviews the relevant information and "the facts warrant a
finding that no violation occurred," the citation or order is vacated.293 At the
conclusion of the conference, MSHA's Office of Assessments evaluates the
citations and orders for proper penalty amounts.
294
Third, MSHA points out that an operator approaching POV status may
implement a CAP to reduce future S&S violations. 9' CAPs are comprehensive
implementation plans for future safety improvements that are tailored to the
mine's specific compliance problems. CAPs contain benchmarks for
implementation and specific guidelines are posted on MSHA's website.297
Before a CAP may be implemented, MSHA must evaluate the CAP to
determine whether it is structured to result in "meaningful, measurable, and
significant reductions in S&S violations. 298 If MSHA approves the CAP and
the operator successfully implements it, MSHA considers the program a
mitigating circumstance in its POV assessment.299
Fourth, MSHA argues that after a mine is issued a POV, an operator
can request to meet with its District Manager for the "limited purpose" of
discussing discrepancies in MSHA's data.3 °° Possible discrepancies include
incorrectly entered citations on MSHA's Monitoring Tool, citations that have
been adjudicated but not yet recorded in MSHA's system, and erroneous
citations. 30 1 During the meeting, the operator may question the underlying data
on which the inspector issued the pattern and offer documentation to support
his position.30 2 After MSHA verifies the alleged discrepancies, MSHA may
terminate the pattern.3 3
290 Id.
291 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(2) (2012).
292 PROCEDURE INSTRUCTION LETTER No. I l-V- 11, supra note 174.
293 30 C.F.R. § 100.6(d).
294 id.
295 Pattern of Violations, 78 Fed. Reg. 5056, 5061 (Jan. 23, 2013) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R.
pt. 104).
296 Id. at 5063.
297 id.
298 Id.
299 Id. at 5061.
30 Id. at 5065.
301 Id.
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Finally, MSHA asserts that the opportunity to request expedited
temporary relief from a pattern designation under section 105(b)(2) of the Mine
Act is an adequate post-deprivation procedure.304 Under this section, an
operator may request expedited temporary relief from a pattern designation or
withdrawal order3 °5 within 30 days of issuance.3 °6 MSHA reviews the request
within 72 hours of receipt, and if granted, the case is assigned to an ALJ.3 7 An
ALJ will accept the request if it raises "issues that rejuire expedited review.
' 30 8
The Commission has not defined these "issues"; however, AL's have
consistently held that "for the contestant to prevail, it must bear the burden of
showing extraordinary or unique circumstances resulting in continuing harm or
hardship., 31° For example, the Commission has found a withdrawal order that
is still in effect when it reviews the request is sufficient grounds for the
contestant to prevail.31' In addition, the Commission may grant relief only if:
(1) a hearing was held in which all parties had an opportunity to be heard; (2)
the applicant proves that a substantial likelihood exists for the Commission's
findings to be favorable to the applicant; and (3) temporary relief will not put
the health and safety of miners at risk.312
2. Final Orders as Criteria for POV Designation
Prior to the new Final Rule, MSHA considered "[o]nly citations and
orders issued after October 1, 1990, and that have becomefinal shall be used to
identify mines with a potential pattern of violations under this section" in its
initial compliance review.313 The new Final Rule revised these criteria to
304 Id. at 5061.
305 30 U.S.C. § 815(b)(2) (2013). Orders or citations issued under Pattern of Violations, 30
C.F.R§ 104(a) of the Mine Act-non-S&S citations---or § 104(f)-citations for sample
violations--do not qualify for expedited relief.
306 29 C.F.R. § 2700.23(a) (2013).
307 Pattern of Violations, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5061.
308 Id.
309 See Consol. Coal Co., Docket Nos. WEVA 94-157-R, 94-158-R, 94-159-R, at 496
(FMSHRC Feb. 14, 1994), http://www.fmshrc.gov/decisions/alj/94020495.pdf (contest
proceedings).
310 Id.; see also Energy West Mine Co., 15 FMSHRC 2223, 2223 (1993); Pittsburg & Midway
Coal Mining Co., 14 FMSHRC 2136, 2136 (1992); Medicine Bow Coal Co., 12 FMSHRC 904,
906 (1990).
311 See Consol. Coal Co., Docket Nos. WEVA 94-157-R, 94-158-R, 94-159-R, at 496-97
(FMSHRC Feb. 14, 1994), http://www.fmshrc.gov/decisions/alj/94020495.pdf (contest
proceedings).
312 30 U.S.C. § 815(b)(2)(A)-(C) (2013).
313 Pattern of Violations, 78 Fed. Reg. 5056, 5059 (Jan. 23, 2013) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R.
pt. 104) (emphasis in original).
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include non-final citations and orders.3 14 Specifically, MSHA now considers
the following factors in its POV review: (1) citations for S&S violations; (2)
orders for not abating S&S violations under section 104(b) of the Mine Act; (3)
citations and withdrawal orders issued under section 104(d) of the Mine Act
resulting from the mine operator's unwarrantable failure to comply; (4)
imminent danger orders under section 107(a) of the Mine Act; (5) orders under
section 104(g) of the Mine Act requiring withdrawal of miners who have not
received training and who MSHA declares to be a hazard to themselves and
others; (6) enforcement measures, other than section 104(e) of the Mine Act,
that have been applied at the mine; (7) other information that demonstrates a
serious safety or health management problem at the mine, such as accident,
injury, and illness records; and (8) mitigating circumstances.
31 5
MSHA uses these eight factors listed above to evaluate a mine's
accident record.31 6 Also, MSHA will continue to post the specific criteria on its
website that mine operators should access to evaluate their performance.317
Specific criteria for identifying a pattern designation include the number and
rate of S&S violations.31 8
If, after an inspection, MSHA determines the mine meets POV criteria,
the District Manager will issue a POV notice to the operator that specifies the
basis for MSHA's decision. 319 The procedures following a POV notice-
request for an inspection, closure orders for subsequent S&S violations found
within 90 days of POV notice, and termination procedure-mirror those that
existed prior to the new Final Rule.
320
However, MSHA's procedures preceding the POV notice are much
different, as is the inclusion of non-final orders into the POV calculation.
MSHA argues it is not bound to only consider final orders for the following
reasons: (1) considering all orders and citations reveals a mine's most recent
compliance history; (2) the Mine Act does not prevent MSHA from revising the
criteria; and (3) the final order requirement is inconsistent with the Mine Act's
legislative history.321
First, MSHA argues the final order requirement impedes its ability to
consider a mine's most recent compliance history, because finalization of
314 See id. at 5056.
315 Id.
316 id.
317 Id. For more specific POV criteria, see Pattern of Violations Screening Criteria - 2013,
MSHA, available at http://www.msha.gov/pov/POVScreeningCriteria2013.pdf (last visited Oct.
16, 2014).
318 Pattern of Violations, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5056.
319 30 U.S.C. § 814(a) (2013).
320 Id. § 814(e).
321 See Pattern of Violations, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5059-60.
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citations and orders is increasingly prolonged.322 MSHA also asserts the
Commission's case backlog may postpone or aid in a mine's avoidance of POV
status.323 In support, MSHA points to the recent surge of cases and citations
before the Commission.324 For example, in 2005, approximately 1,000 cases
were pending the Commission's review, including approximately 4,000
citations and orders.325  In January 2013, the Commission faced an
overwhelming total of 10,730 contested cases, comprised of nearly 59,000
citations and orders.326 Because of the backlog, MSHA points out that the time
required to litigate cases has skyrocketed between 2005 and 2011; in 2005, the
average litigation time from filing to final adjudication totaled seven months,
compared to 20 months in 2011.327 MSHA contends that by eliminating the
final order reE2uirement, the impediment to exercising its POV power is
extinguished.3
Second, MSHA argues the plain language of the Mine Act does not
prohibit the revision of criteria, and thus permits the elimination of the final
order requirement. 329 MSHA relies on a provision in the Mine Act that requires
a mine be issued a POV notice "if [it] has a pattern of [S&S] violations of
mandatory health or safety standards .. ,,330 Furthermore, MSHA argues that
because Congress explicitly empowered the Secretary to "make such rules as
he deems necessary to establish [pattern] criteria," 331 the non-final order
revision must be given "controlling weight.5
3 32
Finally, MSHA argues the elimination of the final order requirement is
consistent with the Mine Act's legislative history.333 Several years of
congressional comments, hearings, and committee meetings precede the Act.334
MSHA argues that Congress created the POV provision in response to the
Scotia Mine Disaster, "an accident that 'forcefully demonstrated' the need for
322 Id. at 5059.
323 Id. at 5060.
324 Id. at 5059.
325 Id.
326 Id.
327 Id. As of February 25, 2014, neither MSHA nor the Commission has reported the current
time required to litigate cases.
328 Id.
329 See id. at 5060.
330 30 U.S.C. § 814(e)(1) (2013).
331 Id. § 814(e)(4).
332 Pattern of Violations, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5060 (citing Eagle Broad. Grp. Ltd. v. FCC, 563 F.3d
543, 551-52 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).
333 Id.
334 See generally S. REP. No. 95-181 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3401.
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such a" powerful enforcement tool. 335 Specifically, MSHA quotes Congress's
reference to the Scotia mine as having an "inspection history of recurrent
violations" 336 rather than a "violation history. 3 37 According to MSHA, this
distinction indicates Congress's intent that pattern determinations be based on
all violations and not solely on finalized citations and orders.338
IV. DUE PROCESS CONCERNS
The lack of procedural safeguards against MSHA action puts the
regulated entity at a substantial risk of due process deprivation. Most
controversially, MSHA's newly created power to consider non-final citations
and orders subjects a mine to closure orders based on non-adjudicated
information without adversarial input from the operator prior to the POV
notice.
339
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees no person
shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law" .. ,,340 At minimum, due process requires that an individual subjected to
potential deprivation be given "notice of the case against him" and a fair
opportunity to be heard.341
Although articulated by the Constitution, the Due Process Clause is a
fundamental principle of justice, rather than a clearly defined rule of law.
34 2
The courts are left to determine the acute principles to apply when considering
a due process claim.343 The Supreme Court has determined that "[t]he first
inquiry in every due process challenge is whether the plaintiff has been
deprived of a protected interest in 'property' or 'liberty.'344 Any deprivation of
a protected interest shall be preceded by notice and hearing "appropriate to the
nature of the case. 345 In addition, when analyzing the constitutionality of
agency procedures, the Supreme Court has stated,
335 Pattern of Violations, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5060 (quoting S. REP. No. 95-181, at 32, reprinted in
1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3401, 3425).
336 Id. (emphasis added) (citing S. REP. No. 95-181, at 32, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3401, 3425).
337 Id. (emphasis added).
338 Id.
339 Pattern of Violations, 78 Fed. Reg. 5056, 5059 (Jan. 23, 2013) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R.
pt. 104).
"0 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
341 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348-49 (1976).
342 Territory of Alaska v. Craig Enters., Inc., 355 P.2d 397, 401 (Alaska 1960).
343 See Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997).
344 Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59 (1999).
345 Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
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"Due process" is an elusive concept. Its exact boundaries are
undefinable, and its content varies according to specific factual
contexts. Thus, when governmental agencies adjudicate or
make binding determinations which directly affect the legal
rights of individuals, it is imperative that those agencies use the
procedures which have traditionally been associated with the
judicial process.346
Although courts may scrutinize agency procedure, it is important to recognize
the high level of deference courts afford to an agency's own procedures.347
However, the constitutional guarantee of due process prevents agencies from
eradicating all forms of notice and hearing. 
348
The Constitution protects two types of due process: substantive and
procedural.349 Substantive due process protects against arbitrary and capricious
government action 350 and safeguards the Bill of Rights. 351 However, even
government action that passes the substantive due process test must be fairly
implemented. 352 Determining whether the govermment enforces the law fairly
requires a procedural due process analysis.
When faced with a procedural due process claim, a court must first
determine if a person was deprived of a protected interest, and if so, what
process was due.354 In the landmark case of Mathews v. Eldridge,355 the
Supreme Court established a balancing test to determine what process was due
prior to deprivation: (1) the nature of the private interest; (2) "the risk of...
erroneous deprivation... through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards"; and (3) "the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail. 356
MSHA impedes upon the private interest of a mine's economic
viability when it issues closure orders and citations without any sufficient
346 Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420,442 (1960) (emphasis added).
347 See Process Gas Consumers Grp. v. FERC, 930 F.2d 926, 929 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see also
Gates & Fox Co. v. OSHRC, 790 F.2d 154,156 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
348 Gates, 790 F.2d at 156; Marshall v. Conway, 491 F. Supp. 1123, 1126 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
349 Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990), construed in DeKalb Stone, Inc. v. Cnty. of
DeKalb, 106 F.3d 956, 959 (11 th Cir. 1997); see also Marshall, 491 F. Supp. 1123.
350 Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986); DeKalb, 106 F.3d at 959.
351 DeKalb, 106 F.3d at 959.
352 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987).
353 Id.
354 See, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982).
355 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
356 Id. at 335.
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adversarial input, and by utilizing non-final orders in its POV calculation. The
new Final Rule regulations lack any probative value when weighed against the
erroneous deprivation of a mine operator's constitutional right to be heard.
Although the government's interest in public safety is imperative, this interest
must be weighed against the unconstitutional infringement of due process
rights. The Eldridge factors are foundational in analyzing the due process
violations imposed by MSHA's new Final Rule.
A. Mathews v. Eldridge
In Eldridge, the Supreme Court held that a disability benefit
termination procedure did not violate due process. 357 Pursuant to a federal
administrative procedure that determined continued eligibility for disability
benefits, respondent completed a questionnaire regarding his medical
condition. 358 After conducting a standard investigation, the state agency
charged with monitoring his condition notified respondent, in writing, that his
benefits might be terminated based on his responses. 359 The agency provided
evidence supporting its preliminary decision and informed respondent of his
right to provide additional information prior to final determination.36 In
response to the agency's notice, respondent disputed only one of the agency's
characterizations and claimed the agency had enough medical information to
continue his benefits. 6
The Social Security Administration ("SSA") approved the state
agency's determination to terminate respondent's benefits. 362 The agency
notified respondent that his benefits had been terminated and informed him of
his right to seek reconsideration.363 The respondent declined to elect the
reconsideration process.364 Instead, he filed suit alleging a due process violation
based on the lack of an evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of his
benefits.365
Applying the three-factor test, the Court recognized the uninterrupted,
continued receipt of disability benefits was a protected private interest, but that
it was not a strong enough interest to require a full evidentiary hearing, prior to
358 Id. at 349.
358 Id. at 323-24.
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final termination, in order to prevent erroneous deprivation.366 The Court held
the agency's termination procedure did not create a substantial risk of
erroneous deprivation, and that it provided adequate means by which
respondent received notice and an opportunity to contest termination prior to
final adjudication.367 Finally, the Court ruled a full evidentiary hearing would
create significant administrative and fiscal burdens on the 
government. 368




The first Eldridge prong requires a court to determine the nature of the
private interest at stake.37 A private interest is not arbitrarily defined by an
individual's expectation to that right. 371 Rather, a protected property interest is
a right to which a person has a legitimate claim of entitlement. Moreover, the
Supreme Court has ruled that purely financial deprivations recoverable after a
final adjudication are less significant than irreparable deprivations.
373
The Eldridge Court determined that the respondent's private interest-
the uninterrupted and continued receipt of disability benefits prior to final
administrative decision-was a statutorily created property interest duly
protected under the Due Process Clause. 37 4In determining the nature of that
private interest, the Court contrasted respondent's case with that of an
erroneously terminated welfare benefits recipient, whose benefits may not be
terminated prior to an evidentiary hearing.375 The Court recognized the risk of
deprivation to an erroneously terminated disability recipient might be
significant.376
The Court reasoned the delay between the termination of benefits and
the final adjudication exceeded one year, and the modest resources of a
disabled worker increased this risk of hardship.
377 However, the Court
concluded the needs of a disability recipient are less than that of a welfare
366 Id. at 342-43.
367 See id. at 345- 4 6.
368 Id. at 347-49.
369 Id.
370 Id. at 335.
371 Bd. of Regents of State Coils. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
372 Id.
371 City of L.A. v. David, 538 U.S. 715,717 (2003).
174 Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 332.
371 Id. at 340-43.
376 Id. at 331-32.
377 Id. at 342-43.
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recipient who is without private resources and receives assistance only when
living on the "margin of subsistence., 378 Thus, the Court concluded that
although continued receipt of disability benefits is a constitutionally protected
interest, it is not so great as to demand a full evidentiary hearing prior to final
termination.379
In General Electric Co. v. Jackson,380 the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia ruled that a certain pre-deprivation procedure
enforced by the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") did not offend due
process. 381 General Electric ("GE") challenged the EPA's "pattern and
practice" of administering certain enforcement regulations pursuant to the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
("CERCLA") as unconstitutional.382 Congress enacted CERCLA to ensure that
hazardous waste sites were cleaned up efficiently.383
According to the procedure, once the EPA identified a hazardous site it
decided who was the potentially responsible party ("PRP") and entered into
negotiations with the PRP to clean up the site.3 4 If negotiations failed, the EPA
could issue a "unilateral administrative order" ("UAO") and mandate the PRP
clean up the site.385 However, a UAO could only be issued when the hazardous
waste created an imminent and substantial danger to public health or the
environment. 386 If a PRP believed it was not responsible and refused to comply,
the EPA would then file a civil enforcement action in district court to enforce
the UAO.387 If the reviewing court found the PRP had sufficient cause for not
complying, the PRP was not subject to penalties.388
GE argued the regulations EPA used to administer UAOs deprived GE,
and all identified PRPs, of their "protected liberty and property interests
without a [prior] hearing. '389 GE first alleged that its property interests in stock
price and brand value were protected interests of which they were deprived
when the EPA issued a UAO.390 In support, GE argued the negative market
311 Id. at 340-41.
319 See id. at 343.
380 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D.D.C. 2009).
381 Id. at 11.
382 Id. at 10.





388 Id. at 12.
389 Id. at 14.
390 Id. at 22.
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reactions to an issuance of a UAO significantly decreased these interests.39 1
The court disagreed, and held the interests were not protected upon issuance
because damage to stock price and brand value "could occur anytime any
agency takes any action that the market interprets as adverse against a
company., 392 The district court opined that if the SEC announced a securities
fraud investigation or the FDA announced a recall of a company's drug, the
brand value and stock price would likely decrease.39 3 The court explained the
FDA and SEC's actions would not trigger due process concerns because the
decrease would have resulted only from the market's reaction, not the EPA's
issuing of the order.394 Because the source of the property deprivation was too
speculative, the court ruled the EPA did not substantially deprive GE of its
property interests.395
However, GE also argued that the EPA deprived PRPs of their property
396interests when they elected not to comply with a UAO. The court made the
distinction that stock price and brand value would be protected property
interests at the noncompliance stage.397 In support, it reasoned that PRPs were
normally labeled a "recalcitrant actor" when they chose not to comply with a
UAO, which in turn harmed its stock price. 398 The court recognized that GE's
interests were primarily financial, which were "less troubling because money
[could] be recouped in a post-deprivation hearing. 3 99 However, the court ruled
"[a] substantial financial deprivation bearing collateral consequences-for
example, an effect on a company's operations"-amounted to a "more
significant private interest.
400
Finally, the court found a PRP who chose to comply with a UAO could
be deprived of $4 million, on average, for about three years. 40 1 The court
recognized that for some companies, this amount and timeframe could
materially affect a PRP's economic viability, but for larger companies such as
GE, this amount may not materially impact financial stability to the same









399 Id. at 30; see City of L.A. v. David, 538 U.S. 715, 717 (2003) (holding that purely financial
deprivations are less significant than irreparable deprivations).
400 Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 29; see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 341-42 (1976).
401 Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 30-31.
402 See id. at 30.
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and length of financial deprivation could be substantial.4 °3 The court added that
"although the private interests are [admittedly] less constitutionally significant
... they are sufficiently large" and could carry enough potential collateral
consequences to amount to a substantial private interest.404 Ultimately, the
court concluded that the deprivation of GE's privacy interest was too
speculative and the amount and length of time of the deprivation was
unsubstantial for a company of GE's size and wealth.405
2. Erroneous Deprivation
The second Eldridge factor assesses a procedure's risk of erroneous
deprivation. 406 In correcting an administrative error where post-deprivation
review is prompt and available, generally the only requirement for pre-
deprivation procedures is to provide a reasonably reliable basis to conclude that
the underlying facts support an agency's decision and are "as a responsible
governmental official warrants them to be. 40 7
The Eldridge Court weighed the risk of erroneous deprivation against
the probable value of an evidentiary hearing prior to final termination and
found that the agency's procedures satisfied due process. 40 8 First, the Court
reasoned the procedures were fair and reliable because the agency's medical
assessment requirement provided "routine, standard, and unbiased" medical
information from specialized physicians.4 0 9 The Court noted the respondent
completed a questionnaire prior to termination that "identifie[d] with
particularity" the information the agency used to detennine eligibility.4 0 The
Court explained the respondent had full access to the agency's information
upon which it relied, and the agency provided detailed notice of its tentative
termination assessment, which included the right to directly challenge the
agency's decision and submit additional evidence. 41 1 The Court ultimately
concluded the agency's procedures enabled respondent to sufficiently "'mold'
his argument" to address the precise issues in his case.412
403 Id.
404 Id. at 3 0-3 1.
405 Id.
406 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
407 See, e.g., Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 13 (1979).
408 Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 343.
409 Id. at 343-44.
410 Id. at 345.
411 Id. at 345-46.
412 Id. at 346.
2014]
39
Baker: Stuck Between a Lump of Coal and a Hard Place: The Mine Safety an
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2014
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
In Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. Donovan,4 13 the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals declared an employee reinstatement procedure under the Mine Act
erroneously deprived mine operators of their property interests. 414 In that case,
two employees filed complaints with MSHA, claiming they were wrongfully
discharged for voicing complaints about unsafe working conditions. 415 After
reviewing MSHA's recommendation, the Commission reinstated both
employees pursuant to section 815(c)(1) of the Mine Act ("Rule 44").416
Subsequently, the operators sued MSHA and claimed the procedure violated
due process by forcing them to reinstate terminated employees without first
providing a pre-deprivation hearing.417
Rule 44 prohibited operators from discharging employees who notified
them of potential safety hazards in the mine.41 8 Pursuant to the Mine Act, once
an employee submitted an unlawful discharge complaint, MSHA conducted an
interview within 15 days to determine the complaint's legitimacy.419 Rule 44
required only that the Secretary's application for reinstatement to the
Commission show the complaint was not "frivolously brought," that it included
the Secretary's reasoning for suggesting reinstatement, and that the application
was accompanied by proof of service of process.420 Then, an ALJ reviewed
MSHA's recommendation, and if it appeared it was supported by the
application, "an order of temporary reinstatement [would] be immediately
issued.",421 The court noted after the reinstatement order had been issued, Rule
44 permitted the operator to request a hearing before the ALJ and to seek
temporary relief from the Commission.422 However, the Commission could
review the AL's decision only if a "substantial question of law, policy or
discretion [was] involved.,
423
In ruling on the employees' due process concerns, the Sixth Circuit
recognized the hearing available to the operator within five days of the
reinstatement order was too narrow because it focused solely on whether the
complaint was frivolous and did not address the merits.424 Additionally, the
court characterized the initial procedures leading to the temporary
413 S. Ohio Coal Co. v. Donovan, 774 F.2d 693 (6th Cir. 1985).
414 Id. at 703-04.
415 Id. at 697-98.
416 Id.
417 Id. at 698.





423 Id. at 697.
424 See id. at 704.
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reinstatement order as significantly weak, because MSHA only needed
"'minimal supporting evidence' in favor of the complainant., 425 Also, the court
found the application insufficient because it excluded input from the mine
operator, which was particularly important because reinstatement proceedings
are "inherently subject to factual determination and adversarial input."426 Thus,
the court stated that Rule 44 failed to "[e]nsure any reasonable opportunity for
at least some minimal pre-deprivation hearing., 427 Consequently, the court
found a violation of due process because the hearing procedure created an
increased risk of error by failing to address the merits of the controversy.428
Conversely, in Marshall v. Conway429 the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania concluded that "due process [was] not
offended by not granting defendants a hearing prior to the issuance of citations
and orders., 430 Defendant-mine operators continued operations after having
been issued citations, fines, and withdrawal orders pursuant to the Mine Act.43
When the Secretary of Labor sought to enjoin the operators, the defendants
argued that issuing citations and orders without a prior hearing violated due
process.432 The court's analysis correctly noted that the Mine Act did not
provide operators with pre-deprivation hearings prior to issuing the citations
and withdrawal orders.433 However, the court also acknowledged the
"elaborate" post-order review procedures provided sufficient opportunities for
hearing.434 These procedures included the right of an operator to immediately
contest a citation or order before the Commission, the right to request an
expedited hearing, the right to request expedited temporary relief from an order
or citation, and the opportunity to seek review before the United States Court of
Appeals. 435 The court characterized these procedures as Congress's safeguards
against "arbitrary action or abuse of discretion by administrators in carrying out
their responsibilities under federal statutes., 436 Ultimately, the court found the
process constitutional because the elaborate post-deprivation procedures-
425 Id.
426 Id.
427 Id. at 705.
428 Id. at 704.
429 491 F. Supp. 1123 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
430 Id. at 1127.
431 Id. at 1125.
432 Id. at 1126.
433 Id. at 1126-27.
434 id.
435 Id.
436 Id. at 1127 (quoting Bemitsky v. United States, 620 F.2d 948, 956 (3d Cir. 1980)).
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coupled with the significance of withdrawal orders--created a constitutionally
437accepted level of error.
3. Government's Interest
The final Eldridge factor balances government interest with the nature
of the private interest at stake and the potential for erroneous deprivation.438 A
reviewing court must consider the government function involved along with the
fiscal and administrative burdens that an additional or substitute procedure
would entail. 439 However, financial cost alone is not controlling as to whether a
procedural safeguard is required "prior to some administrative decision.,
440
Rather, the balance between administrative burdens and protecting private
interests requires a determination as to when judicial-type procedures are
essential to assure constitutional faimess.
441
In Eldridge, the Court found the government's interest outweighed the
administrative burdens of a pre-termination evidentiary hearing.442 Although
financial cost alone was not dispositive in determining whether additional
procedural safeguards were appropriate, the Court reasoned that the
government had a strong interest in preserving fiscal and administrative
resources. 443 Specifically, the Court pointed to the "incremental" costs
associated with increased hearings and providing full benefits while final
termination is pending. 444 In addition, the Court asserted an evidentiary hearing
was not always the most efficient or effective means of decision making, and
that only minimal notice and hearing was required to satisfy due process.445
The Court concluded by asserting that the public's trust-in the "good-faith
judgments of the individuals charged by Congress" to administer social• .446
programs-must be given great weight. The Court opined that this was
particularly true when pre-termination procedures provided an effective Fprocess
for the recipient to assert and argue its claim prior to final termination. 44
437 Id. at 1126-27.
438 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347 (1976).
439 Id.
440 Id. at 348; see Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (holding that
additional expense is a factor, but not a justification to deny a hearing that meets the "ordinary
standards of due process").
441 Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 348.
442 Id. at 349.
443 Id. at 348.
444 Id. at 347.
44' Id. at 348-49.
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Similarly, the district court in Conway found the government's interest
in safeguarding public safety overcame any potential risk of erroneous
deprivation.448 The court recognized the flexible nature of due process and the
government's wide discretion to create policies that protect the public.449
Although flexible in nature, the court urged that when public safety is at risk,
"the private interest infringed is reasonably deemed to be of less importance,
[and] an official body can take summary action pending a later hearing. 450 The
court admitted that the cessation order for mining activities "clearly
implicate[d] important private interests" and that the withdrawal order resulted
in serious economic consequences. 451 However, the overriding public concern
for the safety of miners ultimately guided the court's decision.452
In Jackson, the court considered the government's interest in issuing
UAOs to PRPs.453 Under section 106, the EPA could issue a UAO to an
identified PRP who denied liability for the hazardous conditions.454 The UAO
then forced the PRP to clean up the site, so long as the conditions posed an
"imminent and substantial endangerment" to the public or environment due to
an "actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance" from the PRP's
facility. 455 Although subject to a court's discretion, a PRP who chooses not to
comply with the UAO can face up to $32,500 for each day of
noncompliance.456 Similarly, the EPA could seek significant punitive damages
from a PRP who failed to take proper action.457
The court concluded that although a UAO may only be issued under
imminent and substantial conditions for public health and safety, the
government did not have a need for taking "very prompt action. 458 The court
explained the EPA did not always issue UAOs in true emergency situations; but
rather, the EPA regularly cleaned up a site itself and subsequently filed cost
recovery actions in true emergency situations. 459 In addition, the court assessed
the additional process GE proposed-a full judicial hearing before a judge-to
determine the potential burden on the government; the court concluded that
448 Marshall v. Conway, 491 F. Supp. 1123, 1127 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
449 Id.
450 Id. (quoting R.A. Holman & Co. v. SEC, 299 F.2d 127, 131 (D.C. Cir. 1962)).
451 Conway, 491 F. Supp. at 1127.
452 Id.
453 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d 8, 32 (D.D.C. 2009).




458 Id. at 32; see Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91 (1972) (establishing a factor to determine
government interest as assessing whether it has "a special need for very prompt action").
459 Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 32.
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other potential methods of providing an additional process in front of a neutral
decision-maker were more timely and financially feasible, such as an informal
hearing before an ALJ or an agency officer.460 Furthermore, the court reasoned
that because UAOs issued after negotiations with PRPs usually fail, most PRPs
should utilize the pre-issuance hearing that GE proposed.46' Due to the
"complex technical judgments" and high stakes UAOs involved, the court
concluded "any" hearing before a neutral decision-maker would invoke
significant administrative and fiscal burdens.462
The court ultimately held that GE's proposed pre-assessment procedure
was unnecessary to satisfy due process.463 The court reasoned that to allow
every PRP to contest a UAO before a presiding agency officer would, in the
aggregate, constitute substantial financial and administrative costs to the
government.464 Additionally, because the EPA's current procedure boasted
such a small risk of error, the court concluded that the costs of GE's proposal
were too great to justify an additional process.465 Finally, the court concluded
that GE failed to demonstrate its financial interests at stake routinely had
collateral consequences to warrant a greater pre-deprivation process.466 Thus,
the court concluded that the UAO regulations under CERCLA were a more
effective means to address the EPA's potential errors than to invoke any
additional pre-deprivation procedures.467
V. ANALYSIS
The critical legal and policy issue raised by MSHA's new Final Rule is
whether the weight of public interest and safety is greater than that of the
private interest infringed. MSHA could have simply avoided this constitutional
entanglement by creating a minimal pre-deprivation hearing or expanding some
processes already in place; however, it did not. A closer look at each element of
the Eldridge test sheds light on how MSHA's new POV procedures implicate
due process protections, and more critically, how they violate this essential
right. While the public interest of safety outweighs private infringement, the
future of this policy hinges on the likelihood of erroneous deprivation and how
that could be reasonably prevented with little administrative cost or burden to
MSHA.
460 Id.
461 Id. at 33.
462 Id.
463 Id. at 39.
464 Id. at 38.
465 Id.
466 Id. at 38-39.
467 Id. at 39.
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A. Private Interest
Placin a mine on POV is a "severe" penalty resulting in dire financial
consequences. Specifically, courts have recognized that cessation of mining
is a "serious economic consequence" that may result in deprivation.46
However, the Supreme Court has found that purely financial deprivations
recoverable after final adjudication are "less significant than irreparable
deprivations., 470 As history has shown, placing a mine on POV notice most
likely precludes full recovery of the financial deprivation because of the two
mines placed on a pattern, both remain closed.47 1
There is little doubt that a substantial private interest is infringed when
a mine is placed on a pattern; however, the National Mining Association's
("NMA") argument that placing a mine on a pattern "pulls down an operator's
stock value, taking an economic toll, '472 does not by itself constitute a
deprivation.473 Notably, in Jackson, the court held the PRPs' private interests
were not protected upon adverse administrative action because damage to stock
price and brand value "could occur anytime any agency takes any action that
the market interprets as adverse against a company. 4 74 The court specifically
found that damage to stock value was too speculative and explained the agency
did not substantially deprive GE's property interests.475 However, the court
recognized that a substantial financial deprivation bearing collateral
consequences, such as the "effect on a company's operations," amounted to a
more significant private interest.476 While damage to stock value may be too
speculative, POV status clearly impacts company operations.
This critical legal and policy issue hinges on a balance of public
interest versus private infringement. MSHA and the nation clearly recognize
the high stakes involved when unsafe mines continue to operate. Indeed, one
only has to recall the Upper Big Branch Mine disaster and the tragic result of
468 Brief for Petitioners, at *39, Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. Sec'y of Labor, 13-3324, 2014 WL
4067861 (6th Cir. Aug. 19, 2014) (Nos. 13-3324, 13-3325), 2013 WL 5674206.
469 Marshall v. Conway, 491 F. Supp. 1123, 1127 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
470 Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 29; see City of L.A. v. David, 538 U.S. 715, 717 (2003).
471 Press Release, MSHA, supra note 238.
472 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 468, at *41. (NMA argued that the reputational harm
caused by a POV sanction, as well as the mandatory SEC reporting requirements, "predictably"
lead to devalued stock prices because of an investor's unwillingness to invest in a POV-
sanctioned mine. NMA argued this impact to a mine's reputation is a violation of due process
protection.); see Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 709 (1976) (establishing that reputation alone is a
right entitled to due process).
473 Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 22.
474 Id.
475 Id.
476 Id. at 29; see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 341-42 (1976).
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habitually unsafe working conditions.477 Moreover, courts have consistently
sided with the strong public interest of safe working conditions over the
sometimes less important economic deprivations.478 While the economic
deprivation in POV cases is clearly substantial, the loss of life and permanent
impairment is even more substantial. However, this constitutional question will
likely be decided by other Eldridge factors.
B. Erroneous Deprivation
MSHA has gone to great lengths to provide a regulatory framework
that prevents erroneous deprivations. Most notably, MSHA points out that mine
operators should know the details of their compliance history and that there is
no need to provide advance notice of POV designation.479 In fact, MSHA has
created a Monitoring Tool that allows operators to verify the accuracy of the
information MSHA posts. 480 MSHA argues the Monitoring Tool will enable
operators to perform "the same review of their compliance and accident data"
as MSHA.481 While the industry may balk at this requirement, the fact that
MSHA encourages operators to use the online program as a compliance fact-
checking tool should be embraced by an industry that publically touts its
commitment to safety.
MSHA argues the online program has been successful due to the nearly
2,200 hits per month on its website.482 While this number indicates the
program's use and operator compliance, the constitutional significance of the
program dramatically changed when MSHA implemented its new Final Rule.
Prior to March 25, 2013, when the new Final Rule took effect, operators relied
on the Monitoring Tool in addition to the PPOV procedure to review their
compliance history.483 This overlapping approach ensured accuracy; however,
the government still had the ultimate duty of notifying the operator approaching
POV status via the PPOV review procedures.
477 Press Release, MSHA, supra note 27.
478 Marshall v. Conway, 491 F. Supp. 1123, 1127 (E.D. Pa. 1980); see R.A. Holman & Co. v.
SEC, 299 F.2d 127, 131 (D.C. Cir. 1962) ("In a wide variety of situations, it has long been
recognized that where harm to the public is threatened, and the private interest infringed is
reasonably deemed to be of less importance, an official body can take summary action pending a
later hearing.").
479 Pattern of Violations, 78 Fed. Reg. 5056, 5058 (Jan. 23, 2013) (codified at 30 C.F.R. pt.
104).
480 Id. at 5059.
481 Id.
482 Id.
483 See Heath & Garcia, supra note 12, at 592.
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Conversely, MSHA now requires operators to use the Monitoring Tool
as their primary form of notice.48 This raises an interesting query: If the
operator does not detect the administrative error that is included in the POV
calculation, is the operator really at fault for failing to provide itself notice
about a possible POV sanction? It can be argued that this protocol illustrates
MSHA's inability to account for its own reporting errors and ineffective quality
control measures. At the same time, it may also be argued that by employing
multiple approaches and processes the risk of error is greatly diminished.
Additionally, MSHA can legitimately argue that the Monitoring Tool is but one
avenue for providing notice and improving safety; however, without additional
procedural safeguards to ensure effective notice, the process may be inadequate
to provide due process. More importantly, from a policy perspective, a
democratic society should ensure the government retains the burden to provide
notice before adverse action is taken, instead of shifting that burden to the
citizens.
While notice is a major issue that could result in erroneous deprivation,
it pales in comparison to non-final orders being considered in the POV
calculation. In fact, MSHA's assertion that citations and orders previously
issued to a mine provide adequate notice is simply incorrect. Although citations
and violations provide notice, assessing POV status on non-final orders that
may not have been accurately assessed or that are waiting for adjudication will
surely result in erroneous deprivations.
For example, a January 31, 2011, report issued by MSHA revealed that
nearly 20% of issued S&S violations that were litigated in 2009 and 2010 were
either vacated or modified to "non-S&S" status. 485 Furthermore, 33% of the
"unwarrantable failure to comply" citations litigated during the same time
period were either vacated or modified to a lesser, non-S&S violation.486 Both
are subject to, and involve, serious factual determinations. Therefore, MSHA's
argument-that an operator receives notice from issued citations and
violations-falters when compared to its own data.
However, MSHA can legitimately argue that a substantial majority of
issued citations and violations are found to be accurate, and therefore, the risk
of error is low. 4 87 This precise data shines a light on an interesting due process
dilemma. Clearly, courts have been willing to risk erroneous deprivations when
human life is at stake. In fact, "due process is flexible and calls for such
484 See Pattern of Violations, 78 Fed. Reg. 5056, 5056 (Jan. 23, 2013) (to be codified at 30
C.F.R. pt. 104).
485 Nat'l Mining Assoc., supra note 15.
486 Id.
487 See id. If 20% of S&S violations that were litigated were vacated or modified and 33% of
unwarrantable failure to comply violations that were litigated were vacated or modified, then a
clear majority of those citations and violations were found to be accurate. See id.
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procedural protections as the particular situation demands."4 ' With that general
principle in mind, "in a wide variety of situations, it has long been recognized
that where harm to the public is threatened, and the private interest infringed is
reasonably deemed to be of less importance, an official body can take summary
action pending a later hearing. 489
Courts have already examined an analogous situation. 49 In Marshall v.
Conway, the court clearly recognized that cessation of mining activities, caused
by the issuance of a withdrawal order, implicated an important private
interest.491 However, the public interest of safety was given greater weight than
the private infringement.492 The court found that conducting a hearing before
MSHA could issue a withdrawal order would thwart an important function of
the Mine Act.493 The court noted, "[i]n the case of [the Mine] Act, the
balancing of competing private and public interests compels a different
result.
494
Clearly, when imminent danger 495 exists in a mine, or when an S&S
violation is caused by an operator's unwarrantable failure to comply 496 with
488 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
489 R.A. Holman & Co. v. SEC, 299 F.2d 127, 131 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
490 See Marshall v. Conway, 491 F. Supp. 1123 (E.D. Pa. 1980).




495 30 U.S.C. § 8020) (2013). The Mine Act defines imminent danger as "the existence of any
condition or practice in a coal or other mine which could reasonably be expected to cause death
or serious physical harm before such condition or practice can be abated." Id. If during an
inspection, an inspector finds an imminent danger exists, he must issue a withdrawal order
evacuating the affected area of the mine until the violation has been abated. Id. at § 817(a). The
purpose of an imminent danger order is "to immediately remove miners from exposure to serious
hazards and to prevent miners from entering such hazardous areas." Office of Assessment
Citation and Order Explanations, MSHA, http://www.msha.gov/PROGRAMS/assess/
citationsandorders.asp (last visited Oct. 16, 2014) (emphasis added). Also, "[c]ourts have noted
that an imminent danger exists only when the hazardous condition has a reasonable potential to
cause death or serious injury within a short period of time." Id.
496 See, e.g., Office of Assessment Citation and Order Explanations, MSHA,
http://www.msha.gov/PROGRAMS/assess/citationsandorders.asp (last visited Oct. 16, 2014)
(emphasis added) ("A violation is caused by an unwarrantable failure if it is determined that the
mine operator ... has engaged in aggravated conduct constituting more than ordinary
negligence."). Under § 104(d)(1) of the Mine Act, if upon inspection of a mine an inspector finds
an S&S violation was caused by an operator's unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory
safety and health standard, the inspector shall issue a citation to the operator. If during the same
inspection or any subsequent inspection within ninety days of issuing the citation, another S&S
violation exists that is also caused by an unwarrantable failure to comply, the inspector must
issue a withdrawal order for the affected area of the mine until the violation has been abated. 30
U.S.C. § 104(d)(1) (2013).
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mandatory health and safety standards, an inspector should immediately order
the closure and evacuation of the area. In these specific situations, a pre-
deprivation hearing is impractical and would completely undermine this
important safety mechanism.
However, when considering a POV assessment, MSHA is not dealing
with one isolated situation or incident. Rather, the critical piece in assigning a
pattern designation is the number of S&S citations issued to the operator over a
period of time. "Significant and substantial" is not defined in the Mine Act or
its regulations; however, MSHA does require four specific criteria be fulfilled
before an inspector may designate a violation as S&S: (1) the underlying
violation must be of a mandatory safety and health standard; (2) the violation
must contribute to the identified health hazard; (3) there must be a reasonable
likelihood the hazard will result in illness or injury; and (4) there must be a
reasonable likelihood the injury or illness will be reasonably serious.
49 7
There is no doubt that an S&S citation is serious. However, when
compared to the criteria for issuing an imminent danger order or an
unwarrantable failure order, an S&S citation does not rise to the same level of
danger to reasonably justify issuing a withdrawal order. By contrast, one can
justifiably argue that a "pattern" of S&S violations is much more serious than
an isolated incident leading to a withdrawal order, and therefore, the penalty,
result, and ramifications should be more drastic and impactful.
Logically, a pre-deprivation hearing before an imminent danger or
unwarrantable failure to comply with a withdrawal order can take effect makes
zero policy sense; we want regulators and employees faced with tough on-the-
spot decisions to err on the side of safety. Clearly, in those cases, public interest
trumps private infringement. However, pattern assessments are much different
as evidenced by the 200/o-33% error rate for S&S violations and unwarrantable
failure orders contested in 2009 and 2010.498 Here, "reliability (or unreliability)
of the initial procedures leading to [the adverse administrative action] is
perhaps a significant weakness in the administrative scheme under scrutiny. 499
Furthermore, MSHA's claim that the temporary expedited review
procedure pursuant to section 105(b) of the Mine Act is a constitutionally
adequate post-deprivation procedure lacks merit. In Marshall v. Conway,
MSHA issued non-S&S violation withdrawal orders to the defendants, and
therefore, the defendants met the qualifications to request an expedited
review.500 Although the defendants did not take advantage of this
497 Citation and Order Explanations, supra note 495.
498 Nat'l Mining Assoc., supra note 15.
499 S. Ohio Coal Co. v. Donovan, 774 F.2d 693, 704 (6th Cir. 1985) (comparing the situation
to Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 19 (1978)).
500 Marshall v. Conway, 491 F. Supp. 1123, 1125 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
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administrative remedy, the court deemed the review procedure constitutional. °1
Here, when challenging a pattern designation, a mine must have been issued a
withdrawal order prior to requesting expedited review. It is true that a
withdrawal order frequently follows a pattern designation; however, this is not
the case for all situations. The mines that have been placed on a pattern, but
have not received a withdrawal order, are devoid of due process. Thus, the
mine remains subject to a potential withdrawal order without the option to
request relief. Importantly, in this case, the S&S violations that comprise the
crux of the POV assessment remain on the Commission docket awaiting
adjudication. Instead of narrowly focusing on the expedited review procedures
for a select few, a better option is to simply enlarge the process and make it
available to any operator placed on a pattern, regardless of a withdrawal order.
MSHA correctly argues that considering all violations and citations
reveals a mine's most recent compliance history. 502 Examining a mine's most
recent compliance history, or lack thereof, makes the most sense from a policy
and safety perspective. While the NMA may argue that MSHA oversteps its
authority by revising POV criteria without submitting the changes to notice and
comments, 50 3 the law is not a stagnant force incapable of change. The law is a
malleable concept that must be amended and altered to address changing
circumstances and account for new realities. Here, MSHA has undertaken the
task to eliminate dangerous mines and unsafe working conditions; in fact, this
is the sole purpose of why MSHA was created.
Likewise, agencies are given great deference to use their expertise to
craft much needed rules and regulations. Our society and Congress place great
confidence and trust in administrative agencies. However, this agency
autonomy is not without limits nor should it be. Regulations arising from the
administrative process are limited by the Constitution. Here, MSHA has
challenged these constitutional guarantees. While MSHA should be applauded
for taking unsafe mines to task, accomplishing that goal by constitutional
deprivation is not a means with which society should be comfortable. Rather,
this is an argument premised upon constitutional protections, no matter how
unpopular.
MSHA argues that the Mine Act does not preclude it from considering
non-final orders.50 4 While that may be true, this argument carried to its logical
conclusion produces dangerous results: it forces one to accept that every
legislative act has to preclude every possible and conceivable scenario to
prevent agency overreach. That argument is simply implausible and rests
perilously upon a very slippery slope.
501 Id. at 1127.
502 See Pattern of Violations, 78 Fed. Reg. 5056, 5059-60 (Jan. 23, 2013) (to be codified at 30
C.F.R. pt. 104).
503 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 468, at *14-15.
504 Pattern of Violations, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5059.
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MSHA reasons that Congress created the POV provision in response to
the Scotia Mine Disaster in 1976, an accident that "forcefully demonstrated"
the need for such a powerful enforcement tool. 50 5 Specifically, MSHA quotes
Congress's reference to the Scotia mine as having an "inspection history of
recurrent violations"50 6 rather than a violation history. 507 From a safety and
policy perspective, permitting MSHA to consider non-final orders as part of the
POV process undermines one of the most essential functions of MSHA,
especially when violations awaiting adjudication linger on the docket for years.
Despite this administrative nightmare, administrative inefficiency or efficiency
should not be the problem of the regulated-it should be the problem of the
government.
But all is not lost; MSHA is not without recourse and it could easily
modify its own processes to ensure constitutional safeguards while exercising
its POV power. MSHA could simply issue more withdrawal orders, expand the
subject matter discussed in Closeout Conferences and the post-POV assessment
meetings with District Managers, or mandate each district to implement Pre-
Assessment S&H Conferences.50 8 Currently, MSHA has the tools and
processes in place that would likely render this constitutional issue moot. The
real quandary faced by MSHA is whether or not any of its post-inspection
processes provide the operator an ability to provide meaningful input that
produces an administrative decision based on the merits. MSHA argues that its
current regulatory procedures and certain Mine Act provisions provide
sufficient review opportunities to satisfy due process. 50 9 However, a closer
examination calls this assertion into question and puts this extremely important
enforcement tool into constitutional jeopardy.
Generally speaking, an expanded conferencing system would not only
improve communication and administrative efficiency, it would reduce the risk
of erroneous deprivations. In fact, it would solve MSHA's real problem, which
is the fact that cases spend 20 months on average awaiting adjudication, ergo
final orders that can be calculated into the POV assessment.5 10 As stated in
Eldridge, "something less than a full evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to
adverse administrative action. 5 11 MSHA only needs to provide "something
less" than a full hearing before taking adverse action; however, that
505 Id. at 5060 (quoting S. REP. No. 95-181, at 32 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3401, 3432).
506 S. REP. No. 95-181, at 32 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3401, 3432.
507 Pattern of Violations, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5060.
50' See 2013 FMSHRC PERFORMANCE REPORT, supra note 83; see also Press Release, MSHA,
supra note 187.
509 Pattern of Violations, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5061.
510 Id.
511 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343 (1976).
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"something" has to be available and must include adversarial input and some
consideration of evidentiary issues.
Providing a legitimate and substantive conferencing opportunity after
the inspection process would reduce the case backlog and solve this due
process quagmire. When factual determinations are involved, adversarial input
and an opportunity to be heard are constitutional rights.512 By considering
violations, and notfinal orders, MSHA fails to provide this essential right. In
fact, the process must provide at least some minimal determination on the
merits of the controversy. 513 When non-final orders are calculated into the POV
assessment, a minimal determination on the merits is clearly missing.
Similar to the procedure in Donovan, where the hearing was too narrow
and focused solely4 on whether the complaint was frivolously brought, rather
than the merits, 14 here, the Closeout Conference conducted post-mine
inspection precludes any decision of evidentiary issues or factual
determinations. MSHA argues that the Closeout Conference affords the
operator a minimal opportunity to present its side prior to the deprivation.515
However, the sole purpose of the Closeout Conference is limited to a
discussion of the inspector's actions during the inspection, including the
citations and orders issued.5 16 It is not a forum for the operator to contest
citations or present evidence. 51 7 The operator is precluded from discussing the
evidentiary issues that surround the non-final orders and citations. Thus, the
Closeout Conference serves as a debriefing of the inspector's decisions, rather
than an opportunity for a meaningful discussion regarding the merits of the
citations or possible violations.
Likewise, the meeting with the District Manager post-POV assessment
is narrowly focused on errors and discrepancies and lacks consideration on the
merits. The sole purpose of meeting with the District Manager is for the
operator to present discrepancies in MSHA's data upon which the pattern
designation was based. However, this meeting is conducted after the mine has
been placed on a pattern. While the operator's opportunity to question MSHA's
data may reduce the chances of erroneous deprivation in the future, it is a far
cry from an evidentiary or factual determination sufficient to confer due
process prior to depriving a mine of its economic vitality.
512 S. Ohio Coal Co. v. Donovan, 774 F.2d 693, 704 (6th Cir. 1985) (finding the application
for temporary reinstatement insufficient because it excluded input from the operator, and also the
reinstatement procedure unconstitutional because "questions involved in reinstatement
proceedings [were] 'inherently subject to factual determination and adversarial input' (quoting
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 617 (1974))).
513 Id. at 704.
514 Id.
515 Pattern of Violations, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5061.




West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 117, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol117/iss2/7
MSHA 'S STRUGGLE WITH DUE PROCESS
MSHA could have simply avoided this constitutional struggle if the
Pre-Assessment S&H Conference was made available to all claimants.
However, a closer examination of MSHA's implementation of the S&H
process raises serious constitutional concerns. For example, in December 2011,
MSHA announced that it was reintroducing the Pre-Assessment S&H
Conference procedure as a new program to stem the tide of litigation and
reduce the case backlog. 518 However, MSHA did not mandate the
implementation of the program in every district; rather, implementation is
subject to the discretion of each District Manager.519
In addition, MSHA admits "[i]mplementation [of Pre-Assessment S&H
Conferences] may occur slowly or not at all in some districts, until other
backlog reduction strategies take hold and make caseloads more
manageable. ' '520 Thus, in districts where the case backlog is the most
significant, and likely possessing the highest number of S&S violations
pending a hearing, the Pre-Assessment S&H Conference is not an available
avenue for justice. This strategy hardly belies due process and fairness. Thus,
the lack of the Pre-Assessment S&H Conference process in each district only
bolsters operator concerns and skepticism surrounding non-final orders being
included in the POV assessment.
Finally, MSHA argues that an approved CAP is an effective factor in
MSHA's POV review procedures. In its new Final Rule, MSHA reiterates that
it has the discretion to consider mitigating circumstances prior to issuing a POV
notice. However, MSHA's discussion of mitigating circumstances reveals that
its consideration of such circumstances, which include a CAP, is not an
effective measure. For example, MSHA asserts there may be "extraordinary
occasions when a mine meets the POV criteria, but mitigating circumstances
make a POV notice inappropriate. 52' MSHA explains that mitigating
circumstances will be more likely to reduce or alter citations when presented to
it prior to a POV notice.522 When the operator approaches POV status, it must
then notify MSHA of its desire to design a CAP, develop the plan according to
MSHA's guidelines, await MSHA approval, and successfully implement the
plan before MSHA will consider any mitigating circumstances.
Simultaneously, the mine is still subject to POV procedures and if it meets
pattern criteria prior to successful implementation of the CAP, MSHA will
518 2013 FMSHRC PERFORMANCE REPORT, supra note 83.
519 Id. Although equal protection is beyond the scope of this Article, MSHA's approach raises
serious equal protection concerns that a "similarly situated" respondent will be treated
differently. Regardless of equal protection or due process, constitutional compliance is not
voluntary-it is mandatory. See Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 602 (2008).
520 2013 FMSHRC PERFORMANCE REPORT, supra note 83.
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issue a POV notice prior to any meaningful consideration of the operator's
implemented, but unfinished, CAP. While all of these procedures are designed
to provide some opportunity to be heard, none of the procedures by themselves
satisfy due process.
C. Government's Interest
The public interest of safe working conditions clearly outweighs the
infringed private interest. However, MSHA's own data illustrates that there is a
legitimate chance of erroneous deprivations without a more substantial hearing
process. For the court faced with these competing interests, its analysis and
outcome will likely be dictated by the administrative burden placed upon
MSHA.
As announced in Eldridge, courts must consider the government
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that additional or
substitute procedural requirements would entail when examining what process
is due.523 However, financial cost alone is not controlling as to whether a
procedural safeguard is required "prior to an administrative decision. 524
Rather, the balance between administrative burdens and protecting private
interests requires a determination as to when judicial-type procedures are
essential to assure constitutional fairness.5 25 An evidentiary hearing is not
always the most efficient or effective means of decision making, and only
minimal notice and hearing procedures are required to satisfy due process.526
MSHA eliminated the two-prong notice process by which it alerted
operators to possible POV status. Simply put, reinstating the PPOV process
would not be an additional burden on MSHA; instead, it would only require
reinstituting an administrative process that already existed.
More importantly, MSHA's new hearing procedures violate due
process because they lack adversarial input and an opportunity to be heard,
which are essential when factual determinations are critical to MSHA's
determination. As discussed above, the Closeout Conference, post-POV
assessment meeting with a District Manager, and the Pre-Assessment S&H
Conference all have clear procedural defects or are not available. In fact,
MSHA either controls whether or not the operator can elect the process, or
severely limits or outright precludes operator input and evidentiary
considerations. Also, even if these conferencing opportunities were expanded,
all three have an internal conflict that undermines due process. None of the
523 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347 (1976).
524 Id. at 348; see Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (stating that
additional expense is a factor, but not a justification to deny a hearing that meets the "ordinary
standards of due process").
525 Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 348.
526 Id. at 348-49.
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processes allow an administrative decision by a third-party neutral; instead,
each process and its outcome is controlled by an MSHA representative.527 This
internal conflict and lack of process is even more glaring when one considers
the essential fact that non-final orders are considered in the POV process.
MSHA can successfully argue that to require an independent
adjudicator in each case would constitute a significant administrative burden.
Applying the reasoning from Jackson-where the court found that allowing
every claimant an opportunity to contest an adverse administrative action
before a hearing officer aggregately constituted a substantial financial and
administrative burden-here, MSHA would face a substantial burden to
conduct a full evidentiary hearing before an AL. However, a full adversarial
hearing is not what this Article argues. Rather, at a minimum, operators
approaching POV status should have an opportunity to present evidence and be
heard prior to severe adverse administrative action. MSHA could easily open
up the expedited review process to all mines facing POV assessment or simply
provide a substantive hearing process for S&S violations-neither would
constitute a significant burden.
Although GE's proposed process was found to be too burdensome, the
facts in Jackson are clearly distinguishable from this case. Most notably, the
court found the EPA's procedure presented a small risk of error compared to
the claimant's proposed procedure and impending costs. 528 However, here,
S&S violations and unwarrantable failure to comply violations are vacated or
reduced 200/o-3 3% of the time. 529 This constitutes a significant risk of error
rather than a small one.
Even though the Jackson court rejected the process suggested by GE,
dicta stated that other potential methods of providing additional process in front
of a neutral decision-maker were more financially and timely feasible, such as
an informal hearing before an AU or an agency officer.530 Clearly, the court
acknowledged that while some processes are too burdensome or elaborate, an
"informal hearing before an AU or agency officer" is guaranteed by due
process. MSHA could argue its processes permit an informal hearing before an
agency officer. However, those processes are either not available to all
claimants based on geographic region, or the process forbids consideration of
evidentiary issues by the hearing officer. Either way, fairness demands a clear
527 Baker, supra note 20, at 174. CLRs play an important role in the informal adjudicative
process by handling relatively simple cases regarding the legitimacy of certain citations and
orders. However, the absence of a neutral third-party calls into question the fairness of an
operator's hearing. Without additional representation outside of MSHA control, an operator's
opportunity to be heard is severely jeopardized. Id.
528 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d 8, 38 (D.D.C. 2009).
529 Nat'l Mining Assoc., supra note 15.
530 Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 32.
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and predictable process available to all claimants. Due process dictates
safeguards and protection from agency overreach.
VI. CONCLUSION
Unequivocally, everyone can agree that unsafe mines and working
conditions should be corrected and if needed, shut down. MSHA's new Final
Rule that streamlines the POV process and puts more pressure on America's
unsafe coal mines should be applauded as a victory for oversight. However,
these gains and improvements should not come at the expense of violating due
process and the Constitution. While unpopular, these constitutional arguments
are not in support of unscrupulous mine operators who abuse the system or
evade oversight; instead, we should zealously guard our constitutional
guarantees and rights even in the face of what may be expedient or appear just.
As this Article points out, MSHA could easily amend its procedures or reissue
the rule and avoid this constitutional entanglement and unnecessary delay.
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